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       nited Nations peacekeepers, missions, headquarters and offices are 
increasingly the targets of direct attacks by terrorists and suicide bombers 
during armed conflict.1 For instance, a massive truck bomb exploded out-
side the headquarters of the UN Special Representative in Iraq in August 
2003, killing twenty-two, including Sergio Vieira de Mello, the Special Rep-
resentative.2 In August 2011, Boko Haram launched a suicide attack on the 
UN headquarters in Abidjan, Nigeria, killing eighteen people.3 Al-Shabab 
attacked the UN compound in Mogadishu, Somalia, in June 2013, detonat-
ing a suicide car bomb outside the entrance and then storming the com-
pound on foot.4 UN peacekeepers have also been attacked and taken hos-
tage during conflicts in, inter alia, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, Congo, Mali, Sudan, 
Central African Republic and other conflict areas.5  
                                                                                                                      
1. From July 1, 2007 through June 30, 2008 alone, for example, 490 attacks were re-
ported against UN offices, convoys and premises in conflicts and situations of violence 
around the world. Gu Zhenqiu, More Severe Security Challenges, Threats against UN Staff, 
XINHUA (Dec. 12, 2008), http://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/more-severe-security-
challenges-threats-against-un-staff. 
2. Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq, Report (Oct. 
20, 2003), http://www.un.org/News/dh/iraq/safety-security-un-personnel-iraq.pdf; Truck 
Bomb Kills Chief U.N. Envoy to Iraq, CNN (Aug. 20, 2003), http://www.cnn.com/2003/ W 
ORLD/meast/08/19/sprj.irq.main/. 
3. Senan Murray & Adam Nossiter, Suicide Bomber Attacks U.N. Building in Nigeria, 
NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 26, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/27/world/ afri-
ca/27nigeria.html. 
4. Mohammed Ibrahim & Nicholas Kulish, Militants Attack U.N. Compound in Somalia’s 
Capital, NEW YORK TIMES (June 19, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/20/worl 
d/africa/un-compound-in-somalia-is-attacked.html. 
5. Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2016); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. 
SCSL-04-15-A, Appeals Judgment (Special Court for Sierra Leone Oct. 26, 2009); Prose-
cutor v. Abu Garda, Case No. ICC-02/05-02/09, Confirmation of Charges, (Feb. 8, 2010); 
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, Attacks on Civilians in Bentiu and 
Bor: April 2014 (Jan. 9, 2015), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/SS/UN 
MISS_HRDJanuary2015.pdf; DR Congo Unrest: UN Workers Kidnapped, BBC (Apr. 24, 













Beyond these examples of direct attacks, UN humanitarian assistance 
and other civilian facilities have been damaged or destroyed during combat 
operations. The nature of conflict fought unceasingly in civilian areas plac-
es a constant strain on organizations dedicated to civilian protection and 
humanitarian assistance during conflict. In ideal circumstances, their per-
sonnel and facilities remain immune from the violence, as mandated by the 
law, allowing them to carry out their essential tasks of feeding, sheltering, 
educating, and providing medical care. Unfortunately, the reality bears little 
resemblance to this ideal. Organized armed groups and some States have 
proven willing to use civilians, civilian infrastructure, protected objects, and 
facilities providing humanitarian assistance to shield military operations, 
store weapons, hide or transport fighters, and otherwise facilitate combat 
activity.   
Recent conflicts in Gaza and in southern Lebanon showcase these 
challenges, which are exacerbated by the heavily integrated nature of UN 
refugee and humanitarian assistance infrastructure in both Gaza and south-
ern Lebanon.6 For example, Hamas and other terrorist groups in Gaza 
have regularly and repeatedly launched rockets and mortars from within or 
immediately next to UN facilities, whether schools, medical clinics or other 
sites.7 Multiple times, rockets were found at such locations,8 and militants 
                                                                                                                      
Nations Deliberately Killed in 2014, Staff Union Calls on Organization to Do More Towards Protect-
ing Lives, RELIEFWEB (Jan. 13, 2015), http://reliefweb.int/report/world/increased-numb 
er-united-nations-personnel-deliberately-killed-2014-staff-union-calls. 
6. For example, “U.N. facilities in the Gaza Strip include not only official headquar-
ters, but also hundreds of other buildings, including schools and medical clinics that bear 
U.N. insignia.” STATE OF ISRAEL, THE 2014 GAZA CONFLICT, 7 JULY–26 AUGUST 2014: 
FACTUAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 146 n.411 (2015), http://mfa.gov.il/ProtectiveEdge/ Pag-
es/default.aspx. 
7. Sreenivasan Jain, How Hamas Assembles and Fires Rockets, NDTV (Aug. 14, 2014), 
http://www.ndtv.com/world-news/ndtv-exclusive-how-hamas-assembles-and-fires-rock 
ets-641680; Yaakov Lappin, Hamas Fired Anti-Tank Missile from UNRWA School, Yard Was 
Empty When IDF Responded, JERUSALEM POST (July 28, 2014), http://www.jpost.com/ 
Operation-Protective-Edge/Hamas-fired-anti-tank-missile-from-UNRWA-school-yard-wa 
s-empty-when-IDF-respond-369116; U.N. Director on Gaza School Shelling (interview with John 
Ging) (at 5:19), CBC NEWS (July 30, 2014), http://www.cbc.ca/player/News/Politics/ 
Power+%26+Politics/ID/2479781349/; Hamas Admits Rockets Were Fired at Israel from 
Gaza Neighborhoods, CBC NEWS (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/hamas-
admits-rockets-were-fired-at-israel-from-gaza-neighbourhoods-1.2764125.  
8. Press Release, U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near 
East, UNRWA Condemns Placement of Rockets, For a Second Time, in One of Its 
Schools (July 22, 2014), http://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/press-releases/unrwa-con 












used the area in or around them in the course of tactical maneuvers and 
attacks. On several occasions, Israeli airstrikes or artillery fire targeting mili-
tants and rocket launchers near or in UN facilities—to stop attacks and 
destroy Hamas’ capability to launch more attacks—tragically killed or 
wounded men, women and children seeking shelter from the hostilities rag-
ing around them.9  
In condemning these Israeli attacks, top officials at the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) in Gaza and UN Secretary-General 
Ban Ki-Moon stated emphatically that UN facilities are inviolable and any 
shelling or other attacks are “absolutely unacceptable.”10 In the same man-
ner, the UN Board of Inquiry established to review and investigate “inci-
dents involving death and damage at UN premises in Gaza”11 during the 
Israel-Hamas conflict from December 2008 to January 2009 rested its find-
ings on the rule that the inviolability of UN sites is absolute and “cannot be 
overridden by demands of military expediency.”12 These statements and 
                                                                                                                      
Secretary General Launches Inquiry Board to Examine Deaths, Injuries at United Nations 
Premises During 50-Day Gaza War, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/16324 (Nov, 10, 2014), 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sgsm16324.doc.htm; Terrence McCoy, Why Hamas 
Stores Its Weapons Inside Hospitals, Mosques and Schools, WASHINGTON POST (July 31, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/07/31/why-hamas-stor 
es-its-weapons-inside-hospitals-mosques-and-schools/. 
9. THE 2014 GAZA CONFLICT, 7 JULY–26 AUGUST 2014: FACTUAL AND LEGAL AS-
PECTS, supra note 6 at 163, 235; Sudarsan Raghavan et al., U.N. Says Israel Violated Interna-
tional Law, After Shells Hit School in Gaza, WASHINGTON POST (July 30 2014), https://w 
ww.washingtonpost.com/world/israel-presses-attack-16-killed-at-un-school/2014/07/30 
/4a643588-17a5-11e4-85b6-c1451e622637_story.html?utm_term=.8e1a549fb9fb; Alexan-
der Smith, U.S. Criticizes Israel after Yet Another Strike on U.N. School, NBC NEWS (Aug. 4, 
2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/middle-east-unrest/u-s-criticizes-israel-after-y 
et-another-strike-u-n-n171836; Israel: In-Depth Look at Gaza School Attacks, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (Sept. 11, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/11/israel-depth-look-ga 
za-school-attacks.  
10. Ban Ki-Moon ‘Inspired by Courage’ of Children at Bombed Gaza School, THEIR WORLD 
(Oct. 14, 2014), http://theirworld.org/news/ban-ki-moon-8216-inspired-by-courage-821 
7-of-children-at-bombed-gaza-school. See also Lance Bartholomeusz, The Legal Framework 
for Protection of United Nations Humanitarian Premises During Armed Conflict, in 18 MAX 
PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW ONLINE, no. 1, (2014), at 68, 88–89 (ar-
guing that inviolability of UN premises is absolute). 
11. Press Release, Secretary-General, Transcript of Press Conference by Secretary-
General Ban Ki-Moon at United Nations Headquarters, 10 February 2009, U.N. Press 
Release SG/SM/12092 (Feb. 10, 2009), http://www.un.org/press/en/2009/sgsm12092. 
doc.htm. 
12. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated May 15, 2009 from the Secretary-General 













findings raise important questions about the appropriate methodology for 
understanding the protection of UN facilities in areas of military operations 
and conflict—both for the planning and execution of military operations in 
areas near such facilities and for the post-conflict process of determining 
responsibility and enforcing accountability for any damage or legal viola-
tions. The responses to, and discourse surrounding, various incidents in 
which UN facilities in Gaza suffered incidental damage or direct harm in 
the course of hostilities evince two different legal and practical approaches 
to analyzing the nature and extent of their protection. UN officials—
including Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, the UN Special Coordinator for 
the Middle East Peace Process and local UNRWA officials in Gaza—
maintained a singular focus on the inviolability of UN premises, without 
any incorporation or interpretation of the law of armed conflict (LOAC). 
Israel, along with many military observers, analyzed such incidents within 
the LOAC framework, including the definition of military objective and the 
principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions. 
This article examines the international legal protections for UN human-
itarian assistance and other civilian facilities during armed conflict, includ-
ing both general international law setting forth the immunities of the Unit-
ed Nations and LOAC, the relevant legal framework during wartime. Re-
cent conflicts highlight three primary issues: (1) collateral damage to UN 
facilities as a consequence of strikes on military objectives nearby and mili-
tary operations in the immediate vicinity; (2) the misuse of UN facilities for 
military purposes; and (3) direct attacks on fighters, weapons, or other 
equipment that cause damage to such facilities. Although peacekeeping and 
                                                                                                                      
(May 15, 2009), http://www.refworld.org/docid/4a292c8dd.html [hereinafter Secretary-
General’s Summary (2009)] (Forwarding the Secretary-General’s Summary of the Report 
of the United Nations Headquarters Board of Inquiry into Certain Incidents in the Gaza 
Strip Between 27 December 2008 and 19 January 2009 to the Security Council); see also Ido 
Rosenzweig & Yuval Shany, Report of the UN Board of Inquiry on “Operation Cast Lead,” Ter-
rorism and Democracy, ISRAEL DEMOCRACY INSTITUTE (May 2009), http://en.idi.org.il/ 
analysis/terrorism-and-democracy/issue-no-5/report-of-the-un-board-of-inquiry-on-oper 
ation-cast-lead (“[T]he report assumes that the inviolability of UN personnel and facilities 
is absolute and not subject to conditions of military necessity (and therefore, cannot suffer 
collateral damage).”) (last visited Jan. 24, 2017). Although the UN Board of Inquiry estab-
lished to review incidents during Operation Protective Edge in Gaza was tasked only with 
factual findings and did not make any legal findings—thus not addressing inviolability per 
se—its analysis rested on the same general approach, essentially ignoring the operational 
context and information demonstrating that Israeli attacks near UN facilities were in re-












peace enforcement missions faced many attacks, such attacks raise different 
questions under LOAC and are therefore outside the scope of this article.13   
UN facilities around the world enjoy protections enshrined in the 1946 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations 
(CPIUN).14 In particular, Article 3 affirms that “the premises of the United 
Nations shall be inviolable.” This protection helps to enable the UN—and 
its many components, agencies and other offshoots—to carry out the criti-
cal work of protecting, feeding and supporting individuals and communi-
ties around the world in tense and violent situations. At the same time, in 
situations of armed conflict, LOAC governs the conduct of hostilities, in-
cluding the targeting of persons and objects and the protection of civilians, 
the civilian population, civilian objects, and specially-designated objects 
from attack. The interplay between these two legal frameworks provides 
the foundation for understanding the protection of UN premises during 
armed conflict—and the limits of that protection.  
To identify the appropriate parameters for, and limits of, protection for 
such facilities, this article therefore focuses on what inviolability of UN 
premises—the term used in privileges and immunities law—means within 
the context of armed conflict and the law of armed conflict. Part II ad-
dresses the question of which law governs for the purposes of determining 
the scope of protection for UN facilities and analyzing actions during 
armed conflict to assess whether damage to UN facilities violated that law. 
For example, if an attack on Hamas militants causes damage to a nearby 
UN school,15 do we look to the inviolability provisions in the CPIUN or 
the LOAC principle of proportionality to assess the legality of such an at-
tack and the resulting damage? In particular, Part II first explores the 
                                                                                                                      
13. See Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, supra note 5, ¶ 215 (holding that peacekeepers are pro-
tected from attack “to the extent that ‘they are entitled to the protection given to civilians 
or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict”); Abu Garda, supra note 5 
(holding that peacekeepers lose their protection from attack when they directly participate 
in hostilities or combat-related activities); Convention on the Safety of United Nations and 
Associated Personnel art. 2(2), Dec. 9, 1994, 2051 U.N.T.S. 363 (excluding peace en-
forcement missions—i.e., “a United Nations operation authorized by the Security Council 
as an enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in 
which any of the personnel are engaged as combatants against organized armed forces and 
to which the law of international armed conflict applies”—from its scope). 
14. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Feb. 13, 
1946, 21 U.S.T. 1418, T.I.A.S. No. 6900, 1 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter CPIUN]. 
15. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Apr. 27, 2015, from the Secretary-General 
addressed to the President of the Security Council, annex, ¶¶ 43–44, U.N. Doc. 













meaning of “inviolability” in the CPIUN to understand if and how it ap-
plies in the context of military operations, and demonstrates that inviolabil-
ity does not encompass harm from military operations during armed con-
flict. Second, this Part then applies the principle of lex specialis to demon-
strate that even if one extends the principle of inviolability beyond its ac-
cepted understanding, LOAC is the appropriate legal framework for ana-
lyzing harm to UN facilities during armed conflict if there is a conflict be-
tween general international law on immunities of the UN and LOAC. Part 
III then examines how LOAC’s rules on military objectives, specially pro-
tected objects, proportionality and precautions apply in practice when UN 
facilities located in areas of combat operations face direct or collateral con-
sequences from those operations. 
 
II.  THE APPLICABLE LAW: INVIOLABILITY AND LEX SPECIALIS 
 
A. Inviolability of United Nations Premises 
 
In reporting its findings on a January 5, 2009, strike that hit the UN Asma 
elementary school in Gaza, the UN Board of Inquiry established to review 
and investigate incidents of damage to UN facilities during Operation Cast 
Lead stated that the strike was “an egregious breach of the inviolability of 
United Nations premises.”16 Similarly, the UN Special Coordinator for the 
Middle East Peace Process announced in July 2014, during the most recent 
Israel-Hamas conflict, that “we have reminded relevant parties to the con-
flict of their responsibility to protect United Nations operations, personnel 
and premises which must remain inviolable in accordance with applicable 
international law, including the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immun-
ities of the United Nations.”17 
The meaning of inviolability itself is the starting point for understand-
ing the status and special protections for UN facilities in all situations, and 
                                                                                                                      
16. Secretary-General’s Summary (2009), supra note 12, ¶ 16.  
17. Robert Serry, United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Pro-
cess, Statement on the Shelling of UNSCO Premises in Gaza (July 30, 2014), http://ww 
w.unsco.org/Documents/Statements/SC/2014/Statement by the UN Special Coordina-
tor 30 July 2014.pdf. See also Robert Serry, United Nations Special Coordinator for the 
Middle East Peace Process, Statement on the Renewed Escalation in Gaza, Including the 
Strike near an UNRWA School in Rafah (Aug. 3, 2014), http://www.unsco.org/Docume 
nts/Statements/SC/2014/Statement by the UN Special Coordinator 3 August 2014.pdf 
(“The Special Coordinator repeats the call of the Secretary-General that all parties must 












therefore is a fundamental aspect of this discussion. The notion of inviola-
bility is set forth in the CPIUN, which elaborated on the abstract principle 
set forth in Article 105 of the UN Charter: “[t]he Organization shall enjoy 
in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities as 
are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes.”18 At the time the Charter 
was adopted, international organizations were still rare, providing few, if 
any, examples of how to establish the necessary legal personality and im-
munities to best facilitate effective UN operations. Building on the Cove-
nant of the League of Nations, which provided for diplomatic privileges 
and immunities for its personnel and the inviolability of its property, the 
members of the United Nations negotiated and adopted the CPIUN as one 
of its first treaties.19 With regard to facilities and premises of the United 
Nations and any subsidiary organs, the CPIUN provides for two main pro-
tections: immunity and inviolability. For inviolability, Article II, section 3 
of the CPIUN declares: “[t]he premises of the United Nations shall be in-
violable. The property and assets of the United Nations, wherever located 
and by whomsoever held, shall be immune from search, requisition, confis-
cation, expropriation and any other form of interference, whether by exec-
utive, administrative, judicial or legislative action.”20 
Understanding the impact and application of this provision in the con-
text of damage to UN facilities rests on the meaning of the word “inviola-
ble.” With regard to the CPIUN itself, there is little in the way of commen-
tary or travaux préparatoires to provide any guidance as to the intended 
breadth of the term “inviolable” at the time the Convention was adopted. 
Originally drafted as General Assembly Resolution 22A(I), the CPIUN 
builds on the mandates in Articles 104 and 105 of the UN Charter, noting 
in the preamble that the UN and its representatives and officials “shall en-
joy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities 
                                                                                                                      
18. U.N. Charter art. 105. 
19. August Reinisch, Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Con-
vention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies, U.N. AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009), http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/cpiun-cpisa/cpiun-cpisa.ht 
ml. 
20. CPIUN, supra note 14. With regard to immunity, Article II, section 2 states, “The 
United Nations, its property and assets wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall 
enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except in so far as in any particular case 
it has expressly waived its immunity.” UNRWA was established by General Assembly 
Resolution 302(IV) in 1949 and its status as a subsidiary organ is confirmed in Article 22 
of the UN Charter, which authorizes the General Assembly to establish “subsidiary organs 













as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes and . . . for the inde-
pendent exercise of [its] functions.” Like the Convention generally, which 
sought to enable the necessary functional personality and functional im-
munity21 the UN required in order to operate effectively, the protection of 
inviolability is designed to prevent host States from interfering with the 
operations of the United Nations through judicial or other legal intrusion. 
Thus, the second sentence of Article II, section 3, explains and gives con-
text to the concept of inviolability by explaining that UN property and as-
sets will be immune from search, confiscation, and any form of judicial, 
legal or administrative interference.22 
Inviolability thus protects UN facilities from host State intrusion or un-
authorized entry so as to ensure the UN’s—or relevant subsidiary or-
gans’—ability to operate free from interference. General UN practice, in-
cluding headquarters agreements and model status of forces agreements, 
affirms that inviolability is understood as “respect for the UN status and its 
exclusive authority and control within its premises, and consequently, as a 
prohibition on non-consensual entry into UN premises, or search of UN 
vehicles for any reason or purpose and by any authority of the host coun-
try.”23   
Past examples outside the context of Gaza highlight this purpose. For 
example, after the Taliban took control of Kabul, and therefore Afghani-
stan, in 1996, Taliban forces dragged Afghan President Mohammad Naji-
bullah from a UN compound, where he sought protection for several years, 
and executed him.24 Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali “deplored 
                                                                                                                      
21. Reinisch, supra note 19, uses the terms “functional personality” and “functional 
immunity” to highlight that the UN’s personality and immunities are based on the func-
tional needs of the organization. 
22. As the authoritative introductory note to the Convention explains, “[i]n addition 
to immunity from suit, the General Convention provides for the ‘inviolability’ of United 
Nations premises and property which basically means that they are exempted from any 
search, requisition, confiscation, or other forms of executive, administrative, judicial or 
legislative interference.” Id. 
23. Daphna Shraga, UN Premises as “Cities of Refuge”: The Silence of the Laws of War, 18 
STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT, no. 2, (2015), at 89, 92; Agreement Regarding the Headquarters 
of the United Nations sec. 9, U.S.-UN, 61 Stat. 3416, 11 U.N.T.S. 11; Comprehensive 
Review of the Whole Question of Peace-Keeping Operations in All Their Aspects: Model 
Status-of-Forces Agreement for Peace-keeping Operations, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. A/45/594 
(Oct. 9, 1990). 














the abduction of a person who had sought sanctuary in UN premises,”25 
which was “a breach of the inviolability of those premises.”26 More recent-
ly, claims of spying and electronic surveillance of UN premises and confer-
ences have also sparked protests of breaches of inviolability. In 2009 and 
2010, British secret service agents allegedly spied on foreign governments 
at two consecutive UN international climate summits, prompting immedi-
ate calls to respect the inviolability of both diplomatic and UN premises 
and activities.27 Finally, in 2014, a U.S. federal district court refused to au-
thorize service of process against UN headquarters in a suit brought by vic-
tims of Haiti’s cholera epidemic, citing the CPIUN’s protection against be-
                                                                                                                      
25. Ko Swan Sik, Chronicle of Events and Incidents Relating to Asia with Relevance to Interna-
tional Law July 1996–June 1997, 7 ASIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 391, 406 
(1997). 
26. Press Briefing, Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General (Sept. 27, 
1996), http://www.un.org/press/en/1996/19960927.nb27sep.html. 
27. UN to Investigate GCHQ, MI5 Spying on Foreign Delegate at Climate Summit Talks, RT 
(Nov. 5, 2010), http://rt.com/uk/202147-uk-climate-summit-spying/. In response to 
allegations of British intelligence services tapping Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s phone 
during the run up to the 2003 Iraq War, the Secretary-General’s spokesman stated that 
such tapping practices are illegal under the Convention on Privileges and Immunities. Wil-
liam M. Reilly, U.N. to Britain: If Spying on Us, Stop It, UPI, Feb. 26, 2004, http://www. 
upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2004/02/26/UN-to-Britain-If-spying-on-us-
stop-it/31241077833950/. Similarly, allegations of U.S. espionage to gather information 
about the Secretary-General and other high-ranking UN officials surfaced in 2010, trigger-
ing similar reminders of the immunity and inviolability of UN premises and personnel. 
Press Briefing, Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General (Nov. 29, 2010), 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2010/db101129.doc.htm (“[B]earing in mind that we don't 
have any judgement at this stage on the authenticity of the [leaked directive], bearing in 
mind that, I do want to read to you a little passage from the 1946 Convention on the 
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, and this is a direct quote: ‘The premises 
of the United Nations shall be inviolable. The property and assets of the United Nations, 
wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall be immune from search, requisition, con-
fiscation, expropriation and any other form of interference, whether by executive, admin-
istrative, judicial, or legislative action.’”); Robert Booth & Julian Borger, US Diplomats Spied 
on UN Leadership, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2010/nov/28/us-embassy-cables-spying-un (“The UN has previously asserted that bug-
ging the secretary general is illegal, citing the 1946 UN convention on privileges and im-
munities . . . .”); see also Dana Priest & Colum Lynch, Spying Much Denied but Done A Lot at 















ing subject to legal process or other legal enforcement mechanisms by the 
host State.28 
In the absence of any comprehensive treatment or analysis of the con-
cept of inviolability in Article II, section 3, of the CPIUN, reference to the 
concept of inviolability in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 
(VCDR) is instructive. As one commentary to the VCDR explains, “invio-
lability in modern international law is a status accorded to premises, per-
sons or property physically present in the territory of a sovereign State but 
not subject to its jurisdiction in the ordinary way.”29 Article 22 of the 
VCDR thus states:  
 
1. The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the re-
ceiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of the head of 
the mission. 2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take all ap-
propriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intru-
sion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mis-
sion or impairment of its dignity. 3. The premises of the mission, their 
furnishings and other property thereon and the means of transport of the 
mission shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment or execu-
tion.30  
 
This provision is one of the VCDR’s “special rules—privileges and im-
munities—which enable diplomatic missions to act without fear of coer-
cion or harassment through enforcement of local laws and to communicate 
securely with their sending Governments.”31 Article 22 sets forth two obli-
gations owed by the receiving State to the sending State: a duty of absten-
                                                                                                                      
28. Georges v. United Nations, 84 F. Supp. 3d 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Haitians Seek 
Court OK to Send Cholera Complaint, CLASS ACTION REPORTER (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www. 
bankrupt.com/CAR_Public/141029.mbx. See also Brzak v. United Nations, 597 F.3d 107, 
112 (2d Cir. 2010) (“As the [Convention on Privileges and Immunities] makes clear, the 
United Nations enjoys absolute immunity from suit unless ‘it has expressly waived its im-
munity.’”). 
29. EILEEN DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW: COMMENTARY ON THE VIENNA CONVEN-
TION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 135 (3d ed. 2008). 
30. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 22, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 
3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter VCDR]. 
31. Eileen Denza, Introductory Note to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rela-
tions, http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/vcdr/vcdr.html (last visited June 15, 2016). As the pre-
amble to the VCDR states, the purpose of diplomatic immunity is “not to benefit individ-
uals but to ensure the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as 












tion—prohibiting interference in any way with the diplomatic mission—
and a duty of protection.  
The first duty ensures that the diplomatic mission can fulfill its func-
tions and purposes without fear of legal, administrative, executive or judi-
cial action by the host State, or unauthorized entry, search or other intru-
sive action. In this way, inviolability in the VCDR “shelters the mission and 
its members from any constraint or coercion which the receiving State, by 
virtue of its sovereignty, may exercise over all persons and objects present 
anywhere in its territory.”32 Agents of the receiving State may only enter 
diplomatic or consular premises with the prior consent of the head of mis-
sion.33 Inviolability of diplomatic premises in this fashion was an estab-
lished international practice at least as far back as the eighteenth century34 
and rests on the diplomatic premises as “an attribute of the Sending state 
[because] the premises are used as the headquarters of the mission.”35  
The second duty goes beyond this prohibition on interference or other 
governmental action and requires the receiving State to take steps to pro-
tect the diplomatic or consular premises from intrusion, physical invasion 
or other interference. Unlike the first duty of abstention, this second duty 
is a positive duty. “The first aspect of the special duty of protection . . . re-
quires the authorities of the receiving States—normally the police—to pre-
vent unauthorized intrusion on mission premises and on the request of the 
                                                                                                                      
32. LUDWIK DEMBINSKI, THE MODERN LAW OF DIPLOMACY: EXTERNAL MISSIONS 
OF STATES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 191 (1988); see also Report of the Interna-
tional Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR, 12th Sess., Supp. No. 9 at 5–6, 
U.N. Doc. A/3623 (1957), reprinted in [1957] 2 Yearbook of the International Law Com-
mission 137, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1957/Add.1 [hereinafter 1957 ILC Yearbook] 
(explaining that inviolability dictates that a receiving State’s agents cannot enter a mission’s 
premises for any official act whatsoever, even serving a summons at the mission door.). 
33. GRANT MCCLANAHAN, DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES, PROB-
LEMS 50 (1989); David Foster Bartlett, 767 Third Avenue Associates v. Permanent Mission of the 
Republic of Zaire: An Uncompensated Governmental Taking, 45 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW 165, 173 
(1995); René Värk, The Siege of the Estonian Embassy in Moscow: Protection of a Diplomatic Mis-
sion and its Staff in the Receiving State, 15 JURIDICA INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 144 
(2008). 
34. 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. Permanent Mission of Zaire to the United States, 988 
F.2d 295, 300 (2d Cir. 1993). 
35. Draft Articles on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities with Commentaries, 
Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR, 13th 
Sess., Supp. No. 9, U.N. Doc. A/3859, reprinted in [1958] 2 Yearbook of the International 













head of mission to expel invaders.”36 Receiving States have assumed these 
obligations on numerous occasions, particularly in response to embassy 
sieges in the 1980s and 1990s, such as the 1996–1997 Tupac Amaru Revo-
lutionary Movement’s seizure of the Japanese Embassy in Lima, Peru. The 
Peruvian authorities’ eventual raid ended the siege, freed the hostages and 
killed all the guerrillas.37  
In contrast, the most egregious example of a receiving State abdicating 
its responsibilities of protection is the 1979 Iran hostage crisis. The Inter-
national Court of Justice held that “the Iranian Government failed alto-
gether to take any ‘appropriate steps’ to protect the premises, staff and ar-
chives of the United States’ mission against attack by the militants, and to 
take any steps either to prevent this attack or to stop it before it reached its 
completion.”38 Although the government of Iran itself did not directly vio-
late the embassy’s inviolability through its official agents, “an attempt to 
clear the embassy premises, to rescue the persons held hostage, or at least 
‘to persuade the militants to terminate their action against the Embassy’ 
would have to be expected from the Iranian authorities.”39 
The VCDR reinforces that the basic concept of inviolability, as pre-
sented in the CPIUN, focuses on protecting the UN or diplomatic facility 
from interference by the host State in the form of search and seizure, legal, 
judicial or administrative interference, governmental intrusion or other in-
vasion of the property and premises of the facility. Interference or intru-
sion plainly does not equate to damage from combat operations during 
armed conflict.40 Neither the CPIUN nor the VCDR address either the no-
tion of incidental harm to facilities during armed conflict or the legal and 
operational consequences of misuse and abuse of such facilities during 
                                                                                                                      
36. DENZA, supra note 29, at 161. See also Draft Articles on Diplomatic Intercourse 
and Immunities with Commentaries, supra note 35, at 95 (“[The receiving State] is under a 
special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises from any invasion or 
damage, and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its 
dignity. . . . The receiving State must, in order to fulfil this obligation, take special 
measures—over and above those it takes to discharge its general duty of ensuring order.”). 
37. DENZA, supra note 29, at 163. 
38. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 
1980 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 63 (May 24). 
39. A. SAM MULLER, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR HOST STATES: 
ASPECTS OF THEIR LEGAL RELATIONSHIP 196 (1995). 
40. See Shraga, supra note 23, at 92 (“[N]o analogy can be drawn between attacks on 
UN premises during armed conflict, and unauthorized or non-consensual entry to such 












conflict. Both treaties continue to apply during wartime, but remain fo-
cused on their central prohibitions against interference, forced entry and 
other intrusions.41 Indeed, the principle of inviolability simply does not 
contemplate the infliction of damage to UN facilities in the course of mili-
tary operations—whether that damage is due to a deliberate attack or is 
incidental to an attack on a distinct and different objective. As a result, the 
lawfulness of harm to UN facilities, whether direct or indirect, simply does 
not fall within the inviolability construct.   
 
B. Lex Specialis—Which Law Governs? 
 
Inviolability does not address—let alone regulate or prohibit—the use of 
military force against, or causing incidental harm to, UN facilities during 
armed conflict. Questions of harm to and protection of UN facilities dur-
ing armed conflict are therefore determined by LOAC, irrespective of the 
application of inviolability. Even if some, including the UNRWA and the 
Boards of Inquiry,42 seek to extend the CPIUN and its principle of inviola-
bility to damage to UN facilities during military operations, LOAC remains 
the dominant and governing legal regime. 
If two legal regimes are applicable, the issue becomes whether and how 
they conflict and, if so, which law takes precedence in determining the 
rights and obligations of the relevant parties. Here, the CPIUN mandates 
that UN facilities are inviolable, at least in peacetime; LOAC accepts inci-
dental harm to civilians and civilian objects in the course of attacks on law-
ful military objectives and also provides for the loss of protection for civil-
ian and certain specially protected objects when used for military purposes. 
The principle of lex specialis is a primary rule, or methodology, for resolving 
situations of conflict between two legal norms or two legal frameworks.43 
                                                                                                                      
41. See, e.g., Partial Award: Diplomatic Claim, Ethiopia’s Claim 8 (Eri. v. Eth.), 26 
R.I.A.A. 407, ¶ 24 (Eri.–Eth. Claims Comm’n 2005) (“[T]he Commission does not accept 
that the Parties could derogate from their fundamental obligations under the Vienna Con-
vention on Diplomatic Relations, notably those relating to the inviolability of diplomatic 
agents and premises, because of the exigencies of war.”).   
42. See e.g., Secretary-General’s Summary (2009), supra note 12; Bartholomeusz, supra 
note 10, at 83 (“it is not necessary to conduct an analysis under international humanitarian 
law to determine whether there has been a breach of inviolability.”).  
43. A simple difference of perspective between two legal norms is not sufficient, but 
rather “a relationship of conflict exists between two norms if one norm constitutes, has 
led to, or may lead to, a breach of the other.” Marko Milanovic, Norm Conflicts, International 













Lex specialis has a long history and falls within the category of general prin-
ciples of law as a source of international law in the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice.44  
Posing the question of “what rules ought to be observed in such cases” 
of conflict between two legal norms, Grotius explained that “[a]mong 
agreements that are equal . . . that should be given preference which is 
most specific and approaches most nearly to the subject in hand, for spe-
cial provisions are ordinarily more effective than those that are general.”45 
Grotius identified several reasons for a preference for the more specific law 
over the general law: the more specific law is more to the point; it regulates 
the relevant matter more effectively; the more specific law is better able to 
take account of particular circumstances; the need to comply with the more 
specific law is felt more acutely; and the more specific law offers greater 
clarity and definition.46  
                                                                                                                      
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 95, 102 (Orna Ben-Naftali ed., 2011). Similarly, if 
one reaches two opposing results in applying two legal norms, such that an act is lawful 
under one regime and unlawful under the other, a norm conflict requiring resolution ex-
ists. As Vattel explained, 
 
There is a collision or opposition between two laws, two promises, or two treaties, when a 
case occurs in which it is impossible to fulfill both at the same time, though otherwise the 
laws or treaties in question are not contradictory, and may be both fulfilled under different 
circumstances. They are considered as contrary in this particular case; and it is required to 
show which deserves the preference, or to which an exception ought to be made on the 
occasion . . . . 
 
2 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW 
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS ch. XVII, ¶ 311 
(Neill H. Alford Jr. ed., Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Institute of Washington 1916) 
(1758). 
44. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(c), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993. See Sylvia Borelli, (Mis)-Use of General Principles of Law: Lex Specialis 
and the Relationship Between International Human Rights Law and the Law of Armed Conflict, in 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW—THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY, IUS GENTIUM: COMPAR-
ATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON LAW AND JUSTICE 46, 47–48 (Laura Pineschi ed., 2015) (noting 
general principles of law are norms of general legal reasoning recognized in the majority of 
domestic legal systems and can be transported to and applied at the international level). 
45. 2 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES, ch. XVI, § XXIX, at 
428 (James Brown Scott ed., Francis W. Kelsey trans., Clarendon Press 1925) (1646). 
46. Id. Similarly, after setting forth the challenge of conflicting legal norms, Vattel 
highlighted the same reasons for applying lex specialis as an interpretive tool:  
 
Of the laws of two conventions, we ought . . . to prefer the one which is less general, and 












The International Law Commission and public international law schol-
ars emphasize two understandings of how lex specialis works. First, “a par-
ticular rule may be considered an application of the general rule in a given 
circumstance.”47 The particular—or more specific—rule thus provides 
elaboration or instructions as to the interpretation and requirements of the 
general rule.48 A second conception of lex specialis arises when a more spe-
cific rule serves as an exception to the general rule. The interpretive maxim 
thus “cover[s] the case where two legal provisions that are both valid and 
applicable are in no express hierarchical relationship and provide incompat-
ible direction on how to deal with the same set of facts.”49 This second 
conception best describes the interpretive conflict that arises with regard to 
the protections due UN facilities during armed conflict and the identifica-
tion of legal violations: two co-existent legal regimes with no hierarchical 
relationship that provide—at least in specific situations—conflicting de-
terminations of the relevant legal obligations and authorities.50 In such situ-
ations of norm conflict, “the principle that special law derogates from gen-
eral law is a widely accepted maxim of legal interpretation and technique 
for the resolution of normative conflicts.”51 
                                                                                                                      
exceptions than that which is general; it is enjoined with greater precision, and appears to 
have been more pointedly intended. 
 
VATTEL, supra note 43, at 316. 
47. Martti Koskenniemi, Study on the Function and Scope of the Lex Specialis Rule 
and the Question of “Self-Contained Regimes,” 4, ILC(LVI)/SG/FIL/CRD.1 and Add.1 
(May 7, 2004). 
48. Id.; Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, International Legal Protec-
tion of Human Rights in Armed Conflict, HR/PUB/11/01, at 59 (2011). 
49. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, supra note 48. 
50. As the commentary on the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for In-
ternationally Wrongful Acts explains, “for the lex specialis principle to apply it is not 
enough that the same subject matter is dealt with by two provisions; there must be some 
actual inconsistency between them, or else a discernable intention that one provision is to 
exclude the other.” Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, Report of the International Law Commission, 53d Sess., Apr. 23–June 1, July 2–
Aug. 10, 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, GAOR 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001), reprinted in 
[2001] 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 32, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/ 
2001/Add.1 (Part 2), at 140, ¶ 4. 
51. Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, Fragmentation of 
International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, at 
34, ¶ 56, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, (Apr. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Fragmentation of Inter-
national Law]. The ILC Study on Fragmentation thus reaffirms that in either of the two 














1. LOAC and the CPIUN 
 
In analyzing how to apply lex specialis to the question of the inviolability of 
UN facilities during armed conflict, consider the two primary scenarios that 
arose during the recent conflicts between Israel and Hamas and other Pal-
estinian armed groups in Gaza and a third that could arise in similar situa-
tions of armed conflict. First, in a number of situations in both the 2008–
2009 and 2014 conflicts, Hamas and other armed groups stored weapons in 
UN schools, used tunnels positioned underneath a UN medical clinic and 
fired rockets from the courtyard or close vicinity of UN facilities. Second, 
in both of those conflicts, UN schools or clinics suffered damage as the 
result of hostilities nearby or from Israeli attacks on military targets in the 
vicinity of the facility. Third, it is possible that one party to an armed con-
flict might target a UN facility directly as a lawful military objective in re-
sponse to the other party using that facility for military purposes.52  
Both the CPIUN and LOAC prohibit the first scenario—the use of 
UN facilities for military purposes,53 so no conflict of norms arises. Indeed, 
such misuse of UN facilities falls squarely within the notion of interference 
that inviolability prohibits. However, in the second case and the hypothet-
ical third scenario, the two legal regimes lead to conflicting results with re-
gard to authorities and prohibitions. Although the CPIUN states that UN 
facilities are inviolable, LOAC accepts incidental harm to civilians and civil-
ian objects, including protected objects, in the course of attacks on lawful 
military objects, and provides exceptions to the immunity of specially pro-
                                                                                                                      
tween two norms—“priority falls on the provision which is ‘special,’ that is, the rule with a 
more precisely delimited scope of application.” Id. at 35, ¶ 57. See also Borelli, supra note 
44, at 53 (“[T]hat maxim, in its strict sense, and as is clear from the word ‘derogat,’ implies 
the (partial or total) disapplication or displacement of the general law in favor of the spe-
cial law.”); JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 388 
(2009). 
52. Although there were allegations of such direct attacks on UN facilities during the 
2014 conflict in Gaza, the UN Board of Inquiry made no findings of deliberate targeting 
of those facilities. In addition, Israel explicitly stated that it never made a UNRWA school 
the object of attack. THE 2014 GAZA CONFLICT, 7 JULY–26 AUGUST 2014: FACTUAL AND 
LEGAL ASPECTS, supra note 6, at 163. 
53. LOAC prohibits the use of UN medical facilities—which are specially protected 
objects—for military purposes. See infra Part III.A.2. Other UN facilities, such as schools 
or shelters, lose their protection from attack if used for military purposes, but the use itself 












tected objects when they are used for military purposes—leading to con-
flicting conclusions about the lawfulness of such harm. 
While the CPIUN provides the general rule prohibiting interference 
with, and intrusion into, a UN facility, without addressing armed conflict at 
all,54 LOAC sets forth the rules applicable during the specific situation of 
armed conflict and thus “the special nature of the facts justifies a deviation 
from what otherwise would be the ‘normal’ course of action.”55 By defini-
tion, therefore, LOAC is the specific law because it applies only in the spe-
cific circumstances of armed conflict—and thus is “the lex specialis in rela-
tion to rules laying out the peace-time norms relating to the same sub-
jects.”56 LOAC effectively operates as an exception to legal normalcy and 
overrides peacetime norms in the case of direct conflict between the two 
regimes.57  
The fact that LOAC is the more specialized law does not mean that the 
CPIUN or other relevant international law ceases to apply in situations of 
armed conflict. Indeed, the protections of the CPIUN, diplomatic law, 
human rights law and other legal regimes are essential during armed con-
flict, just as during peacetime. But ignoring the special circumstances of 
armed conflict or equating conflict and peacetime undermines the role of 
LOAC and the object and purposes of this law. Thus, even if it might be 
considered “desirable . . . to discard the difference between peace and 
armed conflict, the exception that war continues to be to the normality of 
peace could not be simply overlooked when determining what standards 
should be used to judge behavior in those (exceptional) circumstances.”58 
Unlike the CPIUN and other legal frameworks within public international 
                                                                                                                      
54. Indeed, inviolability as codified in the Convention, and as understood more 
broadly in diplomatic and consular law, focuses on the activities of the host State in the 
judicial, administrative, legal and State security arenas and does not incorporate questions 
of targeting, incidental damage and other fundamental principles from LOAC and situa-
tions of armed conflict. 
55. Fragmentation of International Law, supra note 51, at 57, ¶ 105. 
56. Id. at 56, ¶ 103. 
57. Id. at 6. See also C. Wilfred Jenks, The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties, 30 BRITISH 
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 446 (1953). See, e.g., Fragmentation of International 
Law, supra note 51, at 57, ¶ 104 (“The example of the laws of war focus on a case where 
the rule itself identifies the conditions in which it is to apply, namely the presence of an 
‘armed conflict.’ Owing to that condition, the rule appears more ‘special’ than if no such 
condition had been identified. To regard this as a situation of lex specialis draws attention to 
an important aspect of the operation of the principle. Even as it works so as to justify 
recourse to an exception, what is being set aside does not vanish altogether.”). 













law, which were not developed with the particularities and exigencies of 
armed conflict in mind, LOAC “was especially conceived for the conduct 
of hostilities and . . . [t]hus, it is fair to say that for the conduct of hostili-
ties, [LOAC] is the more refined body of law.”59  
In the absence of any judicial or administrative examination of how 
LOAC and the CPIUN should and would interact, other analogous scenar-
ios prove useful. For example, one of the war crimes in the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court demonstrates exactly this analysis. Arti-
cle 8(2)(b)(iii) defines the following conduct as a war crime:  
 
intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, 
units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping 
mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as 
they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects un-
der the international law of armed conflict.60 
 
As the wording indicates, the immunity and protections of such units or 
facilities—to which we can readily analogize other UN relief facilities for 
the purposes of the instant analysis—depends on the use or conduct of 
such entities as determined by the legal framework, definitions and rules of 
LOAC.  
In essence, the particular presentation of the crime of attacks on UN 
humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping missions is an implementation of 
the principle of lex specialis, in the same way that lex specialis should deter-
mine the correct approach to harm to other UN facilities. As the provision 
states, in the event of a deliberate attack on such a UN entity, its personnel 
or its material, one must first ask whether the property and persons at-
tacked were entitled to the protections due to civilian objects or civilians as 
categorized by LOAC, not by any other source of law. Thus, personnel of 
such missions lose their protection “when and as long as they take a direct 
part in hostilities” and objects lose protection when “used to make an ef-
fective contribution to the military action of a party to a conflict.”61 These 
understandings stem directly from the relevant LOAC provisions found in 
Additional Protocol I: Article 51(3) with regard to direct participation in 
                                                                                                                      
59. Cordula Droege, The Interplay between International Humanitarian Law and International 
Human Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict, 40 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 310, 344 (2007). 
60. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(iii), July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
61. KNUT DÖRMANN, ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF 












hostilities62 and Article 52(2) with regard to the definition of military objec-
tives.63 Similarly, humanitarian assistance missions, including both person-
nel and installations, “lose their protection if they commit [or are used to 
commit], outside their humanitarian function, acts harmful to the enemy.”64 
Again, this framework rests on LOAC, drawing on the rules and obliga-
tions set forth in the First, Second and Fourth Geneva Conventions, and 
Additional Protocol I.65  
If absolute inviolability were indeed the correct framework for protec-
tion for UN facilities during armed conflict, the criminalization of attacks 
on UN missions and facilities would look entirely different and would have 
no qualification with regard to use for military purposes or acts harmful to 
the enemy. The text of the Rome Statute, as negotiated and acceded to by 
over one hundred countries, emphatically reinforces LOAC as the lex spe-
cialis with regard to the lawfulness of deliberate attacks on or incidental 
harm to UN facilities during armed conflict. 
                                                                                                                      
62. Article 51(3) of Additional Protocol I states that “civilians shall enjoy the protec-
tion afforded by this section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostili-
ties.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. 
63. Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I defines military objectives, including when 
civilian objects lose their protection and become lawful military objectives: “In so far as 
objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their na-
ture, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose 
total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the 
time, offers a definite military advantage.”  
64. DÖRMANN, supra note 61, at 159–60. 
65. See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
in Armed Forces in the Field art. 21, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [here-
inafter Geneva Convention I] (“The protection to which fixed establishments and mobile 
medical units of the Medical Service are entitled shall not cease unless they are used to 
commit, outside their humanitarian duties, acts harmful to the enemy.”); Convention for 
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of 
Armed Forces at Sea art. 34, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter 
Geneva Convention II] (“The protection to which hospital ships and sick-bays are entitled 
shall not cease unless they are used to commit, outside their humanitarian duties, acts 
harmful to the enemy.”); Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War art. 19, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva 
Convention IV] (“The protection to which civilian hospitals are entitled shall not cease 
unless they are used to commit, outside their humanitarian duties, acts harmful to the en-
emy.”); Additional Protocol I, supra note 62, art. 13 (“The protection to which civilian 
medical units are entitled shall not cease unless they are used to commit, outside their hu-













A look at how diplomatic law treats questions of the use of force in 
self-defense in or against diplomatic premises offers similar guidance. At 
first glance, one might conclude that self-defense has no place in the arena 
of diplomatic immunity because the VCDR “allows for absolutely no ex-
ceptions to the principle of diplomatic inviolability.”66 This firm stance ex-
cluding all exceptions stemmed from the fear of abuse of any stated excep-
tions. However, the preamble to the VCDR affirms that “rules of custom-
ary international law should continue to govern questions not expressly 
regulated by the provisions of the present Convention.” Self-defense falls 
directly within this category of issues not expressly regulated. As the Inter-
national Law Commission’s commentary states, the principle of inviolabil-
ity “does not exclude either self-defense or, in exceptional circumstances, 
measures to prevent the diplomatic agent from committing crimes or of-
fences.”67 
Indeed, States have historically accepted that diplomatic immunity and 
inviolability are not absolutes in the face of legitimate self-defense needs. 
Rather, self-defense provided a legitimate reason for an intrusion or use of 
force that would otherwise be in violation of the immunity or inviolability 
diplomatic law required.68 As early as 1830, a U.S. federal court held that “if 
a minister assaults another, he may [even] be killed in self-defense though 
not by way of punishment.”69 A century later, the Preparatory Committee 
                                                                                                                      
66. John S. Beaumont, Self-Defence as a Justification for Disregarding Diplomatic Immunity, 29 
CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 391, 396 (1991). 
67. 1957 ILC Yearbook, supra note 32, at 138. See also Beaumont, supra note 66, at 397 
(“[A] closer examination of both the Convention itself and of commentary submitted by 
the International Law Commission prior to the Vienna Conference reveals that the doc-
trine of self-defence was not within the scope of the Convention’s general ban on all ex-
ceptions to the principle of diplomatic inviolability.”). 
68. Grotius explained, for example, that “all human laws have been so adjusted that in 
case of dire necessity they are not binding; and so the same rule will hold in regard to the 
law of the inviolability of ambassadors.” GROTIUS, supra note 45, at 444 (adding that “if an 
ambassador should attempt armed force he can indeed be killed, not by way of penalty, 
but in natural defence”). 
69. United States v. Benner, 24 Fed Cas. 1084, 1085 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1830). Oppenheim 
took a similar approach, recognizing both the importance of diplomatic inviolability and 
the necessary exception to restrain and counter acts of violence by a diplomatic envoy. 1 
LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 388 (1912) (“[T]here is one exception. For if 
a diplomatic envoy commits an act of violence which disturbs the internal order of the 
receiving State in such a manner as makes it necessary to put him under restraint for the 
purpose of preventing similar acts, he may be arrested for the time being . . . .”). See also 
Preparatory Committee, Conference for the Codification of International Law, Damages 












of the 1930 Hague Conference noted that a State cannot be held “respon-
sible for damage caused . . . by its armed forces or authorities in the sup-
pression of an insurrection, riot or other disturbance.”70 When the interna-
tional community began to codify the long history of diplomatic law in the 
form of the VCDR, self-defense remained a viable means for States to re-
spond to threats or violence from diplomatic agents or premises.71  
The diplomatic law regime thus reaffirms the same lex specialis ap-
proach: diplomatic law remains the overarching framework for determining 
and governing the rights and duties of diplomatic agents and States, but the 
specific situation of armed conflict or other situation in which a diplomatic 
agent uses—or diplomatic premises are used for—violence against the 
State allows for and justifies acts taken in self-defense or to remove the 
threat from such person or premises.72   
 
2. The Comay-Michelmore Exchange of Letters 
 
Beyond the broad framework of both the CPIUN and diplomatic law, 
which apply to all situations involving UN facilities or diplomatic and con-
sular facilities, respectively, the specific context of Israel’s relationship with 
UNRWA—the agency with UN facilities throughout the Gaza Strip, where 
issues of damage to or even attacks on UN facilities have arisen most re-
cently and predominantly—demonstrates exactly this operation of lex spe-
cialis. Like all other UN agencies, UNRWA enjoys the privileges and im-
munities enshrined in the CPIUN. However, the context of armed conflict 
then frames the operation of these protections within the relationship be-
tween Israel and UNRWA.  
                                                                                                                      
29.V (1929) (noting that a State’s responsibility for action against a diplomatic agent—that 
is, the extent of that person’s diplomatic protection—would be a function of the threat 
such person posed). 
70. Preparatory Committee, supra note 69, at 107. 
71. As the International Law Commission stated in its commentary to the draft con-
vention on diplomatic and consular relations, diplomatic inviolability “does not exclude... 
measures of self-defence.” Draft Articles on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities, supra 
note 36, at 97. 
72. See Beaumont, supra note 66, at 391 (“[T]he principle of self-defense is relevant in 
diplomatic law, and it may provide a legitimate pretext for acting in violation of diplomatic 
immunity”); Draft Articles on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities, supra note 36, at 75 
(“Thus article 21 reflects the generally accepted position that self-defence precludes the 













After the 1967 war, Israel and UNRWA penned an exchange of letters 
regarding relations between Israel and UNRWA, in light of the transition 
from operations under Jordanian and Egyptian control of the relevant terri-
tories. Affirming that the CPIUN governs relations between Israel and 
UNRWA, the exchange then confirms the role of military security as the 
determining factor in the extent to which and how the basic protections 
and privileges of UNRWA facilities would be carried out. The letter from 
the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Commissioner-General of 
UNRWA states, “the Israel Government will facilitate the task of UNRWA 
to the best of its ability, subject only to regulations or arrangements which 
may be necessitated by considerations of military security.”73 Accepting and 
agreeing to this construct, the Commissioner-General of UNRWA declared 
in response that he expects “that such restrictions as may for the time be-
ing be placed on the full use of those facilities will be removed as soon as 
considerations of military security permit.”74 As a result, “UNRWA contin-
ued its operations as it had during Jordanian and Egyptian control of the 
territories, and with the exception of matters pertaining to ‘military securi-
ty,’ UNRWA’s installations and activities remained inviolable and governed 
by the UN’s standard Privileges and Immunities document.”75  
More than twenty-five years later, upon the signing of the Declaration 
of Principles on the Interim Self-Government Arrangements, on Septem-
ber 13, 1993, and the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, 
on May 4, 1994, between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO), the latter organization entered into an exchange of letters with the 
Commissioner-General of UNRWA.76 In this exchange, the PLO “pledged 
to apply, in all relations with UNRWA, relevant articles of the Charter of 
                                                                                                                      
73. Exchange of Letters Constituting a Provisional Agreement Concerning Assistance 
to Palestine Refugees, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees 
in the Near East-Israel, June 14, 1967, 620 U.N.T.S. 183, http://www.accesscoordination. 
org/Doc/comaymichelmore.pdf. 
74. Id. 
75. EMMANUEL ADLER & BEVERLY CRAWFORD, PROGRESS AND POST-WAR INTER-
NATIONAL RELATIONS 389 (1991). 
76. Exchange of letters dated 24 June 1994 for the purpose of facilitating UNRWA to 
continue to provide its assistance to the Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip and the 
Jericho Area and in the remainder of the West Bank, Commissioner-General of the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East-Chairman of 
the Palestine Liberation Organization, June 24, 1994. Report of the Commissioner-
General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the 
Near East, 1 July 1993–30 June 1994, to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/49/13 












the United Nations and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities 
of the United Nations.”77 That same year, UNRWA began preparing to 
move its headquarters from Vienna to Gaza by the end of 1995, as well as 
relocating other operational branches from Vienna to Amman. Throughout 
this process, however, the framework established in the Comay-
Michelmore exchange of letters for the relationship between Israel and 
UNRWA remained the same, with the application of the privileges and 
immunities in the CPIUN subject to “considerations of military security” 
as needed.  
In effect, the Comay-Michelmore agreement is a microcosm of the 
broader lex specialis paradigm for determining the applicable law in situa-
tions of incidental harm to or deliberate targeting of UN facilities during 
armed conflict. The recognition by both Israel and UNRWA of the needs 
of military security affirm that military operations and other security needs 
driven by the armed conflict between Israel and Palestinian armed groups 
are a specific context—one that must be governed by a specific law, 
LOAC, that is designed precisely for those circumstances. The agreement 
therefore reaffirms that LOAC determines the legality of damage to, mis-
use of, or attacks on UN facilities during armed conflict. 
 
III. PROTECTION OF UN FACILITIES UNDER LOAC 
 
LOAC provides the legal rules and analysis to determine the lawfulness of 
the types of harm to UN facilities at issue and therefore also to guide deci-
sion-makers and operators proactively in the appropriate lawful conduct of 
military operations in the vicinity of UN sites. LOAC—also known as the 
law of war or international humanitarian law—governs the conduct of both 
States and individuals during armed conflict and seeks to minimize suffer-
ing in war by protecting persons not participating in hostilities and by re-
stricting the means and methods of warfare.78 LOAC applies during all sit-
                                                                                                                      
77. Id. ¶ 9. 
78. See Legal Factsheet: What is International Humanitarian Law?, ICRC (Dec. 31, 2004), 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/legal-fact-sheet/humanitarian-law-factsh 
eet.htm. The law of armed conflict is codified primarily in the four Geneva Conventions 
of August 14, 1949 and their Additional Protocols. Geneva Convention I, supra note 65; 
Geneva Convention II, supra note 65; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva 
Convention III]; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 65; Additional Protocol I, supra note 













uations of armed conflict, whether between two or more States, between a 
State and a non-State group, or between two or more non-State groups.79  
The lawfulness of targeting individuals and objects, including UN facili-
ties, during armed conflict is determined by the principles of distinction, 
proportionality and precautions. The principle of distinction mandates that 
all parties to an armed conflict distinguish between those who are fighting 
and those who are not and to only direct attacks at the former.80 The prin-
ciple of proportionality requires that parties to a conflict refrain from 
launching any attack in which the expected civilian casualties are likely to 
be excessive in light of the anticipated military advantage to be gained.81 
Finally, the principle of precautions obligates all parties to an armed con-
flict to take all feasible precautions to protect civilians from harm during 
military operations, including precautions when launching attacks and pre-
cautions when defending against attacks.82 In particular, for the purposes of 
this article, which focuses on targeting and the identification of military 
objectives and the application of proportionality and precautions to mini-
mize harm to civilians and civilian objects, the legal obligations and princi-
                                                                                                                      
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II]. 
79. For international armed conflict, Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions 
of August 1949 states that the Conventions “shall apply to all cases of declared war or of 
any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting 
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.” Geneva Convention I, 
supra note 65, art. 2; Geneva Convention II, supra note 65, art. 2; Geneva Convention III, 
supra note 78, art. 2; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 65, art. 2. For non-international 
armed conflict, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions sets forth minimum provi-
sions applicable “in the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring 
in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.” Geneva Convention I, supra note 
65, art. 3; Geneva Convention II, supra note 65, art. 3; Geneva Convention III, supra note 
78, art. 3; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 65, art. 3 [hereinafter Common Article 3]. See 
also OSCAR M. UHLER ET AL., COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION IV RELATIVE TO 
THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 26 (Ronald Griffin & C.W. 
Dumbleton trans., 1958) [hereinafter GC IV COMMENTARY] (“Born on the battlefield, the 
Red Cross called into being the First Geneva Convention to protect wounded and sick 
military personnel. Extending its solicitude little by little to other categories of war victims, 
in logical application of its fundamental principle, it pointed the way, first to the revision 
of the original Convention, and then to the extension of legal protection in turn to prison-
ers of war and civilians. The same logical process could not fail to lead to the idea of ap-
plying the principle to all cases of armed conflict, including internal ones.”). 
80. Additional Protocol I, supra note 62, arts. 48, 51. 
81. Id. arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b). 












ples applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts 
are nearly identical.83 
This Part analyzes the application of these fundamental tenets of 
LOAC to the three activities highlighted earlier: use of UN facilities for 
military operations, deliberate targeting of UN facilities and incidental harm 
to UN facilities. The first sub-part examines the definition of military ob-
jectives and the consequences when civilian objects—and specially protect-
ed objects in particular—are used for military purposes, analyzing the legal 
parameters governing the first two activities. The second sub-part address-
es the third activity—incidental harm to UN facilities—and presents 
LOAC’s framework for protecting civilians and civilian objects through the 
obligations set forth in the principles of proportionality and precautions. 
Further, this Part highlights the critical role that LOAC plays in enhancing 
and maximizing protections for UN facilities and other civilian and pro-
tected objects during conflict and, more importantly, how disregarding 
LOAC’s framework in favor of a concept of absolute immunity or inviola-
bility undermines those protections by incentivizing repeated abuse of that 
very inviolability. 
 
A. Identifying Lawful Military Objectives and Misuse of UN Facilities 
 
One of the most fundamental issues during armed conflict is identifying 
who or what can be targeted. The principle of distinction, one of the “car-
dinal principles” of LOAC,84 requires that any party to a conflict distinguish 
between those who are fighting and those who are not and direct attacks 
solely against the former. Similarly, parties must distinguish between civil-
                                                                                                                      
83. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR-72, Decision on Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 96–127 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugosla-
via Oct 2, 1995) (highlighting the development and applicability of necessity, distinction, 
humanity, and proportionality to internal armed conflict); EVE LA HAYE, WAR CRIMES IN 
INTERNAL CONFLICTS 380 (2010) (discussing the overlap between the LOAC applicable in 
internal and international armed conflict). See also Laurie R. Blank, Extending Positive Identifi-
cation from Persons to Places: Terrorism, Armed Conflict, and the Identification of Military Objectives, 
2013 UTAH LAW REVIEW 1227. 
84. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, ¶ 78 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons] (declaring that distinction and the prohibi-














ian objects and military objects and target only the latter.85 Distinction thus 
lies at the core of LOAC’s seminal goal of protecting innocent civilians and 
persons who are hors de combat. With respect to objects, the core issue here, 
LOAC defines objects that can be attacked and mandates enhanced protec-
tions for certain special categories of objects. The prohibition on using ci-
vilian objects for military purposes—and the loss of protection for civilian 
objects used in such a manner—incorporates LOAC’s balance between 
military necessity and humanitarian considerations.86 These prohibitions 
also enhance protection for civilians by seeking to ensure that civilian loca-
tions and objects remain safe for civilians and are not converted into mili-
tary facilities at the risk of harm to the civilians living or working in or near 
such facilities.   
 
1. UN Facilities and the Definition of Military Objectives 
 
Article 52 of Additional Protocol I contains the definition of military ob-
jective, which is considered to be customary international law.87 First, Arti-
cle 52(1) declares that “[c]ivilian objects shall not be the object of attack or 
of reprisals” and defines civilian objects as “all objects which are not mili-
tary objectives.” Attacks on civilian objects, including UN facilities, are 
therefore flatly prohibited.88 Like the definition of civilian in Article 50 of 
Additional Protocol I,89 the definition of civilian object is a negative one, 
                                                                                                                      
85. Additional Protocol I, supra note 62, art. 48. Article 48 of Additional Protocol I 
thus sets forth the basic rule: “In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian 
population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish be-
tween the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military 
objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.” 
Article 48 is considered customary international law. See 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 3–8 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005); 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL ¶ 2.5 (rev. ed. Dec. 2016) [hereinafter 
DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL]; UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, JSP 383: THE 
JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT § 2.5 (2004) [hereinafter UK 
MANUAL]. 
86. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTER-
NATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 4 (2d ed. 2010). 
87. THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOM-
ARY LAW 64–65 (1989).  
88. Additional Protocol I, supra note 62, art. 51; Rome Statute, supra note 60, art. 8. 
89. Additional Protocol I, supra note 62, art. 50(1) (“A civilian is any person who does 
not belong to one of the categories of persons referred to in Article 4 A (1), (2), (3) and (6) 












dependent on the definition of military objective, which appears in Article 
52(2): 
 
In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those 
objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective 
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, cap-
ture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a def-
inite military advantage. 
 
Although Additional Protocol I applies as a matter of treaty law only to 
States party in international armed conflicts, these rules for determining 
when objects constitute military objectives apply to all parties in both in-
ternational and non-international armed conflict as a matter of customary 
law.90  
The definition includes four criteria for determining whether a particu-
lar object qualifies as a military objective by making an effective contribu-
tion to military action—nature, location, purpose or use. Nature refers to 
“all objects directly used by the armed forces: weapons, equipment, trans-
ports, fortifications, depots, buildings occupied by armed forces, staff 
headquarters, communications centres, etc.”91 Thus, military bases, units, 
equipment and forces, for example, can be attacked at any time. These are 
objects that are inherently military, that is, they have “intrinsic military sig-
nificance”92 and by their nature make an effective contribution to military 
                                                                                                                      
90. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 85, at 29. Fur-
thermore, several treaties applicable in non-international armed conflict incorporate this 
definition of military objective, including Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Cer-
tain Conventional Weapons; Amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices art. 2(6), May 3, 1996, 2048 U.N.T.S. 93; 
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col on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons art. 1(3), Apr. 10, 
1981, 1342 U.N.T.S. 171. 
91. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GE-
NEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 636 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & 
Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987) [hereinafter PROTOCOL COMMENTARY]. For extensive 
lists of objects that are inherently military by nature, see id. at 632–33 n.3; A.P.V. ROGERS, 
LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 37 (1996); DINSTEIN, supra note 86, at 88. 













action. In the specific contexts here, none of the UN facilities would be 
military objectives by nature—indeed, their intrinsic nature is civilian and 
humanitarian.  
The categories of “use” and “purpose” refer respectively to an object’s 
present or intended function, and generally involve non-military objects, 
thus requiring further examination in given situations. An example of use 
that would cause an object to be classified as a military objective would be 
school buses or private taxis93 used to transport troops to the front during 
conflict. Purpose, in contrast, depends on the enemy’s intended future use 
of an object and must inherently be based on intelligence gathering and 
analysis regarding the enemy’s intentions. Thus, “[w]hen reliable intelli-
gence or other information indicates that the enemy intends to use an ob-
ject militarily in the future, the object qualifies as a military objective 
through ‘purpose.’”94 Any civilian object—even a UN facility—can thus 
become a lawful military objective if one party to a conflict is using or in-
tends to use it for military purposes in accordance with the strictures of the 
definition of military objective.95 
When used for the educational, medical and humanitarian purposes for 
which they are designed and funded, UN facilities do not fall within the 
categories of military objective based on use or purpose. However, UN 
facilities that are used for military purposes will become military objectives 
                                                                                                                      
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 277, 280 (Susan Breau & Agnieszka Jachec-
Neale eds., 2006). 
93. During World War I, the “Taxis of the Marne” were commandeered to bring 
French reserve units to the front line. Once they were used in that manner, they became 
legitimate military objectives even though when they served their normal purpose—
private taxis—they were civilian objects. See DINSTEIN, supra note 86, at 97–98 (citing 2 
GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL 
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 112 (1968)). 
94. Schmitt, supra note 92, at 280. As the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission ex-
plained in holding that the not-yet-completed Hirgigo Power Station in Eritrea was a law-
ful military objective liable to attack by Ethiopian forces: “a State at war should not be 
obligated to wait until an object is, in fact, put into use when the purpose of that object is 
such that it will make an effective contribution to military action once it has been tested, 
commissioned and put to use.” Partial Award: Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and 
Related Claims (Eri. v. Eth.), 26 R.I.A.A. 291, 334–35 (Eri.-Eth. Claims Comm’n 2005). 
95. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNLAWFUL AND DEADLY: ROCKET AND 
MORTAR ATTACKS BY PALESTINIAN ARMED GROUPS DURING THE 2014 GAZA/ISRAEL 
CONFLICT 37–45 (2015), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde21/1178/2015/e 
n/ (documenting numerous examples of Palestinian armed groups firing rockets from in 
or next to schools, hospitals, churches and residential buildings, and storing munitions in 












and liable to attack, like any other civilian object. Indeed, the claim of abso-
lute inviolability rests on the incorrect notion that there are some objects 
that can never be attacked, notwithstanding the fact that one side is using 
them to launch attacks or for other military purposes. LOAC simply does 
not include such a concept as “never target.” 
Rather, the analysis under Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I centers 
on whether the use of the object in question makes an effective contribu-
tion to military action—the first part of the definition of military objec-
tive—and whether its destruction, capture or neutralization offers a defi-
nite military advantage. Many of the examples reported during the 2014 
Gaza conflict and earlier conflicts—storing weapons in residential build-
ings, schools, mosques, churches or hospitals; and launching rockets from 
in or near civilian buildings—fit directly within this construct. As the U.S. 
Department of Defense’s Law of War Manual states, “objects that contain 
military objectives are military objectives,” including storage and produc-
tion sites for military equipment (which certainly includes mortars and 
rockets) and buildings or other facilities “in which combatants are shelter-
ing or billeting.”96 For example, the 2014 UN Board of Inquiry examining 
incidents from the 2014 Gaza conflict noted that in one incident, where 
Israeli forces destroyed portions of an UNRWA school being used as an 
observation post and command and control structure, Israeli forces found 
“a Palestinian Islamic Jihad operational map and other military equipment” 
in the school.97  
Analyses by national courts, international tribunals and other fact-
finding missions reached the same conclusions in other cases. For example, 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) held 
                                                                                                                      
96. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 85, § 5.6.4.2. See also ROGERS, supra note 
91, at 36 (“A civilian object which contains military personnel or things of military signifi-
cance is considered a military objective.”). Canada’s manual, The Law of Armed Conflict at the 
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merous other countries. CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF (CANADA), B-GJ-005-104/FP-
021, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AT THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS ¶ 407(2) 
(2001) (“Civilian vessels, aircraft, vehicles and buildings are military objectives if they con-
tain combatants, military equipment or supplies.”); Practice Relating to Rule 10: Civilian Ob-
jects’ Loss of Protection from Attack, ICRC, https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v 
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97. Secretary-General’s Summary (2015), supra note 15, ¶ 47. The Board of Inquiry 
found “the commander on the ground had decided, for imperative reasons of military 
necessity, to clear an additional area of structures that were part of the school compound 













that a post office used as a communications center for the Serb forces in 
the Krajina (SVK) and the government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina 
was a lawful military objective.98 Similarly, in examining strikes by both 
Georgian and Russian forces on schools in Tskhinvali and Gori, the Inde-
pendent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia de-
termined that when military units used it “as defence positions or other 
posts” or where military forces were in the yard of the school, a school lost 
“its status as a protected civilian object” and became a legitimate military 
target.99 And, in a comprehensive application of the rule of military objec-
tives, the German Federal Prosecutor General at Germany’s Federal Court 
of Justice ruled that the fuel tankers captured by the Taliban and destroyed 
by German forces outside Kunduz, Afghanistan, in a controversial incident 
in September 2009 were lawful military objectives, such that their destruc-
tion was not a violation of LOAC. 
 
The fuel tankers and the fuel were originally civilian objects. They became 
military objectives with the abduction by the Taliban because they were 
suited to effectively contribute to military action from this moment on. 
The fuel could be used to refuel vehicles used for attacks and used in 
combination with explosives as improvised explosive devices. It thus 
constitutes a military objective in any case as its destruction would offer a 
considerable military advantage. The fuel tankers also constituted a mili-
tary objective . . . . The reason is that they could be used for attacks with 
vehicle-based explosive devices as already happened in Afghanistan five 
times in 2009 until 4 September 2009. It is irrelevant that the fuel tankers 
were immobilized on a sandbank. Colonel (Oberst) Klein wanted to pre-
vent any future movement of the tankers. There was the risk that the in-
surgents would successfully free the tankers and use them for military 
purposes. Therefore they did not constitute civilian objects at the time 
when Colonel (Oberst) Klein ordered the dropping of the bombs. The 
same holds true for both vehicles present in the immediate surroundings 
of the fuel tankers. Because of their concrete use they were meant to 
make an effective contribution to the Taliban’s military action.100 
  
                                                                                                                      
98. Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Judgment, ¶ 1899 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the former Yugoslavia Apr. 15, 2011). 
99. 2 INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING MISSION ON THE CONFLICT 
IN GEORGIA, REPORT 328–29 (2009). 
100. Federal Court of Justice, Federal Prosecutor General, Decision ¶ 3(bb) (Apr. 16, 
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By use or purpose (i.e., intended use), therefore, the fuel tankers and the 
fuel in the tankers met the definition of a military objective.   
In the same manner, UN offices, schools, or other facilities will be-
come military objectives when used to store weapons, as shelters for fight-
ers, as command or observation posts, as launching sites for attacks, or as 
sites for tunnels.101 
 
2. Specially Protected Objects: UN Medical Facilities 
 
Some UN facilities, such as UN medical clinics, fall within special catego-
ries of protected objects, because of their nature or function. LOAC pro-
vides additional protection for these special categories—hospitals, religious 
and cultural property, objects indispensable for the civilian population, and 
works and installations containing dangerous forces, such as chemical fac-
tories, dams or nuclear power generating stations102—in an effort to ensure 
either that civilians can continue to benefit from their services and role in 
society or that civilians will have protection against the added danger such 
objects could cause if damaged or compromised. This sub-part focuses on 
hospitals and other medical units as the primary example of UN facilities 
enjoying special protection. Most other UN facilities that have suffered 
damage during armed conflict do not fall within any of LOAC’s special 
protection categories. To the extent any do in the context of a specific situ-
ation, this same analysis will generally apply. 
Under LOAC, hospitals and other medical units, which are essential to 
the protection of both civilians and combatants during armed conflict, re-
ceive special protection in both the Geneva Conventions and the Addi-
tional Protocols. Article 18 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides 
                                                                                                                      
101. Israel: Hamas Mortars Prompted Attack near U.N. School, CNN (Jan. 6, 2009), http:// 
www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/01/06/israel.gaza/index.html?iref=nextin. 
102. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 65, art. 18; Additional Protocol I, supra note 
62, arts. 12, 53, 54, 56. LOAC does not include a provision granting such special protec-
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that “none of the afore-mentioned IHL instruments explicitly grant peacekeeping opera-














that “[c]ivilian hospitals organized to give care to the wounded and sick, 
the infirm and maternity cases, may in no circumstances be the object of 
attack, but shall at all times be respected and protected by the Parties to the 
conflict.”103 The Geneva Conventions also mandate that all hospitals be 
marked with distinctive emblems visible to enemy land, air and naval forces 
and recommend that all hospitals be located as far as possible from military 
objectives.104 Additional Protocol I reinforces this protection of medical 
units in international armed conflict105 and Additional Protocol II mandates 
the same protections in the context of non-international armed conflict as 
well, stating that “[m]edical units and transports shall be respected and pro-
tected at all times and shall not be the object of attack.”106 Furthermore, 
protection of hospitals in non-international armed conflict can also be 
traced to the obligation in Common Article 3 that “the wounded and sick 
shall be collected and cared for.”107 If hospitals did not enjoy protection 
from attack, the wounded and sick could not receive the necessary treat-
ment and the protection they are ensured under LOAC, such that “the only 
logical conclusion is that hospitals are protected in [non-international 
armed conflicts] as in [international armed conflicts], despite the lack of 
express provision to this effect in Common Article 3.”108 
This notion of “respect and protect” lies at the heart of the Geneva 
Conventions framework for the protection of the wounded and the estab-
lishments necessary to ensure their treatment and safety during armed con-
flict. Respect means “‘to spare, not to attack’” and protect means “‘to come 
to someone’s defence, to lend help and support.’”109 Extended beyond the 
individual wounded soldier, the notion of respect and protect then ensures 
                                                                                                                      
103. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 65, art. 18. Article 19 of the First Geneva 
Convention similarly provides that “[f]ixed establishments and mobile medical units of the 
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104. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 65, art. 18. 
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108. THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY 223 (Andrew Clapham, 
Paola Gaeta & Marco Sassoli eds., 2015). 
109. COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION I FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE 
CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 134–35 
(Jean Pictet ed., 1952) [hereinafter GC I COMMENTARY]. Thus, the “respect and protect” 
framework “made it unlawful for an enemy to attack, kill, ill-treat or in any way harm a 
fallen and unarmed soldier, while it at the same time imposed upon the enemy an obliga-












that medical facilities and units are equally safe to perform their essential 
tasks of treating and protecting the wounded and sick, both combatants 
and civilians. The special protections that hospitals enjoy are thus “a logical 
consequence of the principle of inviolability of the wounded, sick, ship-
wrecked, and of medical personnel.”110 As the Commentary to the Fourth 
Geneva Convention emphasizes, the obligation to respect and protect im-
poses on “belligerents . . . a general obligation to do everything possible to 
spare hospitals” and goes beyond a prohibition on deliberate attacks.111  
First, respect means that parties to a conflict do not attack or harm 
medical units in any way.112 This protection extends beyond fixed hospitals 
to medical units in the field, hospital ships, and medical transport, such as 
ambulances. Second, respect for hospitals and medical units requires that 
parties to a conflict “not . . . interfere with their work [and] allow them to 
continue to give treatment to the wounded in their care, as long as this is 
necessary.”113 The obligation to protect then provides an additional af-
firmative obligation “to ensure that [medical facilities and units] are re-
spected, that is to say to oblige third parties to respect them [and to] com[e] 
to their help in case of need.”114 These twin obligations of respect and pro-
tect mirror, in many ways, the two components of inviolability in the 
CPIUN and the VCDR: the duty of abstention and the duty of protection. 
Indeed, these parallels provide implicit support for concomitant parallels 
regarding the limits of these protections as understood in LOAC. 
International criminal law and the general practice and discourse of 
States and international organizations reaffirm these protections. For ex-
ample, the Rome Statute criminalizes as a war crime intentional attacks 
against hospitals,115 humanitarian assistance missions,116 and buildings, 
transport and personnel marked with the distinctive emblems of the Gene-
va Conventions (i.e., the red cross, red crescent, red lion and sun, or red 
crystal).117 All UN hospitals display the red cross or red crescent, like other 
medical facilities. The UN Security Council has repeatedly condemned at-
                                                                                                                      
110. THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 108, at 207. 
111. GC IV COMMENTARY, supra note 79, at 147. 
112. GC I COMMENTARY, supra note 109, at 196. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Rome Statute, supra note 60, arts. 8(2)(b)(ix), 8(2)(e)(iv). 
116. Id. arts. 8(2)(b)(ii), 8(2)(e)(ii). 













tacks on medical units,118 as have other UN agencies and international or-
ganizations.119 Similarly, in investigating allegations of LOAC violations 
during the 2008 conflict between Georgia and Russia, the International 
Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia declared that Russian hel-
icopter attacks indicating a deliberate targeting of a hospital in Gori could 
amount to a war crime.120 This basic structure for the protection of hospi-
tals sets forth the status of hospitals and other medical units as objects en-
joying special protection beyond the protections enjoyed by all civilian ob-
jects.  
However, even specially protected objects such as hospitals or religious 
buildings can lose their protection from attack if used to cause harm to the 
enemy. Article 19 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that “the pro-
tection to which civilian hospitals are entitled shall not cease until they are 
used to commit, outside their humanitarian duties, acts harmful to the en-
emy.”121 This includes UN hospitals, which are civilian hospitals. The defi-
nition of “harmful to the enemy” is quite broad, referring “not only to di-
rect harm inflicted on the enemy, for example, by firing at him, but also to 
any attempts at deliberately hindering his military operations in any way 
whatsoever.”122 Examples include launching rockets from or storing muni-
                                                                                                                      
118. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 771 (Aug. 13, 1992); S.C. Res. 794, pmbl., para. 8 (Dec. 3, 1992) 
(“expressing grave alarm at continuing reports of widespread violations of international 
humanitarian law occurring in Somalia, including . . . deliberate attacks on . . . medical and 
relief facilities” (emphasis omitted)). 
119. See, e.g., Joint Statement by WHO Director-General, Dr. Margaret Chan; UN 
Emergency Relief Coordinator, Valerie Amos; and Anthony Lake, Executive Director of 
the UN Children’s Agency, UN Humanitarian Chiefs Strongly Condemn Attacks on Med-
ical Personnel and Facilities by all Parties to the Syria Conflict (Dec. 6, 2013), http://www. 
who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2013/syria/en/. 
120. INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING MISSION, supra note 99, at 330. 
121. See also Additional Protocol I, supra note 62, art. 13. The First Geneva Conven-
tion includes the same rule with regard to the loss of protection for military medical units 
and establishments. Geneva Convention I, supra note 65, art. 21 (“The protection to which 
fixed establishments and mobile medical units of the Medical Service are entitled shall not 
cease unless they are used to commit, outside their humanitarian duties, acts harmful to 
the enemy.”). 
122. PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 91, at 175. See also GC IV COMMENTARY, 
supra note 79, at 154 (“[H]armful acts would, for example, include the use of a hospital as 
a shelter for able-bodied combatants or fugitives, as an arms or ammunition store, as a 
military observation post, or as a centre for liaison with fighting troops.”). Article 22 of 
the First Geneva Convention and Article 13 of Additional Protocol I also lists four repre-












tions in a hospital, or using a hospital building as a command post—
indeed, many of the very types of activities that are prohibited as improper 
uses of protected objects and emblems regularly occurred in Gaza.123 Simi-
larly, the Iraqi practice of using hospitals and mosques for military uses 
drew strong condemnation, with human rights organizations noting that, 
by using hospitals as military headquarters, Iraqi forces turned them into 
military objectives.124 Indeed, as the Commentary to the Additional Protocols 
states succinctly, “if the medical unit is used to commit acts which are 
harmful to the enemy, it actually becomes a military objective which can 
legitimately be attacked, and even destroyed.”125 In the case of hospitals or 
other medical units that lose their protection from attack due to use for 
military purposes, LOAC requires that the attacking party may only launch 
attacks after giving due warning to cease such military activities and provid-
ing a reasonable time, where appropriate, for ending the hostile activity or 
evacuating wounded and sick to a place of safety.126  
                                                                                                                      
standings and clarify the appropriate role for medical establishments. Article 13(2) thus 
states:  
 
The following shall not be considered as acts harmful to the enemy; (a) that the personnel 
of the unit are equipped with light individual weapons for their own defence or for that of 
the wounded and sick in their charge; (b) that the unit is guarded by a picket or by sentries 
or by an escort; (c) that small arms and ammunition taken from the wounded and sick, 
and not yet handed to the proper service, are found in the units; (d) that members of the 
armed forces or other combatants are in the unit for medical reasons. 
 
123. Yoav Zitun, Video: Terrorists Fire Rockets From Gaza Hospital, YNET NEWS.COM, 
(July 23, 2014), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4548760,00.html; William 
Booth, While Israel Held its Fire, the Militant Group Hamas Did Not, WASHINGTON POST (July 
15, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/while-israel-held-its-fire 
-the-militant-group-hamas-did-not/2014/07/15/116fd3d7-3c0f-4413-94a9-2ab16af1445 
d_story.html?utm_term=.8842f33c5f34. 
124. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OFF TARGET: THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR AND CI-
VILIAN CASUALTIES IN IRAQ 73 (2003), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1203/usa 
1203.pdf.  
125. PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 91, at 176. See also Prosecutor v. Galić, 
Case No. IT-98-29-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 344 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former 
Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2006) (“Therefore, where a hospital is used for one of the hostile 
purposes articulated [in the commentaries], or for an analogous purpose, or for a purpose 
even more obviously hostile, the hospital loses protection and becomes a legitimate mili-
tary objective while used for that purpose.”).  
126. Geneva Convention I, supra note 65, art. 21; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 













The loss of protection from attack for specially protected objects when 
used for military purposes thus applies to hospitals, religious and cultural 
property, UN facilities or installations, and other civilian objects not grant-
ed any special protections. In case of any doubt regarding the loss of pro-
tection for specially protected objects, the Rome Statute provides specific 
confirmation of this rule. In both international and non-international 
armed conflicts, intentionally directing attacks against UN installations or 
units is a war crime “as long as [such] facilities are entitled to the protection 
given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed 
conflict.”127 In the same manner, the Rome Statue also criminalizes attacks 
on hospitals or religious or cultural buildings, “provided they are not mili-
tary objectives.”128 For both war crimes, the definition of military objective 
determines whether an attack on a protected building or object is a crime 
or whether that building or object has lost its protection from attack. As a 
result, “an object is entitled to protection, unless and for such time as it is 
used to make an effective contribution to the military action of a party to a 
conflict,”129 even if that object is a hospital, a church, a mosque or a UN 
facility. The Rome Statute thus confirms that when a UN facility—whether 
a peacekeeping unit or installation or a building forming part of a humani-
tarian assistance mission—is used for military purposes, attacks on that fa-
cility are not violations of LOAC. 
The claim of absolute inviolability during armed conflict inherent in 
UNRWA’s statements and the 2009 and 2014 Boards of Inquiry’s findings 
is, in essence, an argument that a UN facility being used for military pur-
poses—such as a health clinic housing a Hamas tunnel entry shaft130 or a 
hospital serving as an attack base and a command and control post131—
                                                                                                                      
127. Rome Statute, supra note 60, art. 8(2)(b)(iii) (regarding war crimes in international 
armed conflict), art. 8(2)(e)(iii) (regarding war crimes in non-international armed conflict). 
128. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(ix) (regarding war crimes in international armed conflict), art. 
8(2)(e)(iv) (regarding war crimes in non-international armed conflict). 
129. DÖRMANN, supra note 61, at 159. See also id. at 227 (noting that hospitals and cul-
tural and religious objects “are only protected provided they are not military objectives as 
defined in Art. 52(2) AP I”); id. at 455 (“[A]n object is entitled to protection unless and for 
such time as it is used to make an effective contribution to the military action of a party to 
a conflict.”). 
130. Mitch Ginsburg, Militants “Blow Up UNRWA Clinic,” Killing 3 Soldiers, TIMES OF 
ISRAEL (July 30, 2014), http://www.timesofisrael.com/3-idf-soldiers-killed-in-booby-trapp 
ed-unrwa-clinic/. 
131. Yaakov Lappin, Terrorists Fire Anti-Tank Missile from Al-Wafa Hospital in Gaza, JE-












does not become a military objective as a result of that military use. And 
yet, under the definition of military objective, such facility makes an effec-
tive contribution to military action by its use and its destruction or neutrali-
zation offers a definite military advantage in the circumstances ruling at the 
time. As such, this argument attempts to claim that unlike any other object, 
including specially protected objects under the Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocols, a UN facility can never be a military objective, even if 
one party’s forces use it as a headquarters or are firing at the other party’s 
troops from the facility.132 Nowhere in LOAC’s extensive treaties and cus-
tomary law is there any provision exempting one type of object or building 
entirely from the definition of military objective. Indeed, the law states 
clearly that any specially protected object, whether a hospital, religious or 
cultural building, or even an object containing dangerous forces, can be-
come a legitimate target of attack if used for military purposes such that it 
meets the definition of military objective under Article 52(2) of Additional 
Protocol I, customary LOAC applicable in international and non-
international armed conflict, and any other specific rules for that category 
of specially protected objects.133  
 
3. Prohibitions on the Use of Specially Protected Objects and Emblems 
for Military Purposes 
 
The use of civilian objects for military purposes runs counter to the fun-
damental premise of LOAC to protect civilians from the horrors and suf-
fering of war. Article 57 of Additional Protocol I thus requires that “in the 
conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the 
                                                                                                                      
rorists-fire-anti-tank-missile-from-Al-Wafa-hospital-368818; see Galić Appeals Chamber 
Judgment, supra note 125. 
132. Secretary-General’s Summary (2015), supra note 15, ¶ 70. 
133. See, e.g., Geneva Convention I, supra note 65, art. 21; Geneva Convention IV, su-
pra note 65, art. 19; Additional Protocol I, supra note 62, arts. 13, 56(2), 65; Additional 
Protocol II, supra note 78, art. 11(2); Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in 
the Event of Armed Conflict art. 4(2), May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215 [hereinafter Hague 
Cultural Property Convention]. Note that Article 56 of Additional Protocol I provides a 
rule of exceptionally special protection for works and installations containing dangerous 
forces, such that they “shall not be made the object of attack, even where these objects are 
military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and conse-
quent severe losses among the civilian population.” However, even this special protection 
can “cease[] under Article 56(2) only in extreme circumstances of ‘regular, significant and 













civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.”134 The use of civilian ob-
jects for military purposes will also often violate the prohibition on the use 
of human shields and the defending party’s obligation to avoid locating 
military objectives in densely populated areas.135 In most cases, the primary 
consequence for using civilian objects for military purposes is that those 
objects will become military objectives and therefore susceptible to attack, 
as discussed above. 
Specially protected objects, such as hospitals and religious or cultural 
property, however, merit a further layer of protection: in addition to the 
loss of protection from attack, the use of such objects for military purpos-
es, including to shield military objectives, can itself be a violation of LOAC. 
Additional Protocol I also specifically prohibits the improper use of the 
distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions (i.e., the red cross, red 
crescent, red lion and sun, or red crystal) and the UN emblem and the use 
of such emblems in perfidious attacks.136 These additional protections and 
prohibitions help to ensure that they remain available to the civilian popu-
lation and to protect the humanitarian purposes at the core of LOAC. 
These prohibitions thus work as natural partners to the CPIUN’s mandate 
of inviolability and immunity for UN facilities, in essence serving as a war-
time complement to international law’s ordinary protections against inter-
ference with the operations, infrastructure and facilities of UN entities. 
First, Article 12(4) of Additional Protocol I declares that “under no cir-
cumstances shall medical units be used in an attempt to shield military ob-
jectives from attack.” The ICRC Commentary here focuses on the placement 
of medical units or facilities “on the periphery of military objectives” as an 
attempt to immunize those objectives from attack, noting that doing so is a 
violation of LOAC and “would completely distort the spirit of humanitari-
an law and devalue both the victims being cared for and the medical per-
sonnel who would be knowingly exposed to very grave danger.”137 Indeed, 
using medical units in this manner goes against the very purposes of the 
Geneva Conventions dating back to the first Geneva Convention of 
                                                                                                                      
134. Additional Protocol I, supra note 62, art. 57(1). The concept of military opera-
tions is quite broad and extends beyond combat to “any movements, manoeuvres and 
other activities whatsoever carried out by the armed forces with a view to combat.” PRO-
TOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 91, at 680. 
135. For more comprehensive discussion of these prohibitions and obligations, see 
Laurie R. Blank, Taking Distinction to the Next Level: Accountability for Fighters’ Failure to Distin-
guish Themselves from Civilians, 46 VALPARAISO LAW REVIEW 765 (2012). 
136. Additional Protocol I, supra note 62, arts. 37, 38. 












1864.138 However, the use of medical facilities to shield military objectives 
can extend well beyond this idea of peripheral shielding. Placing rocket 
launchers in a hospital courtyard or on the hospital roof,139 using medical 
facilities to shelter combatants or for command and control,140 storing 
weapons and other military equipment in or next to hospitals141—all of 
these activities also involve using the medical establishment to shield mili-
tary objectives from attack.  
Second, LOAC prohibits the improper use of the emblems of the Ge-
neva Conventions, the uniform or emblem of the United Nations, or other 
internationally recognized emblems, such as the protective emblem of cul-
tural property, the international distinctive sign of civil defense and the in-
ternational sign for installations containing dangerous forces.142 The red 
cross or red crescent are used to mark hospitals, including UN hospitals.143 
In general, “improper use” is understood to mean any use that is not au-
thorized by the Conventions or other relevant instrument. As the Commen-
tary to Additional Protocol I explains, the distinctive emblem of the Gene-
va Conventions 
 
allows its bearers to venture on to the battlefield to carry out their hu-
manitarian task. It bears witness to the totally inoffensive character of the 
persons and objects that it designates, as well as to the impartial, useful 
and orderly nature of their humanitarian task, and in return, it grants 
them immunity. Thus it should be displayed in good faith and in accord-
                                                                                                                      
138. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in 
the Field, Aug. 22, 1864, 22 Stat. 940, 129 Consol. T.S. 361. 
139. Joshua Levitt, Finnish TV Reporter at Gaza’s Al-Shifa Hospital: “It’s True that Rockets 
are Launched Here From the Gazan Side Into Israel,” ALGEMEINER (Aug. 1, 2014), https://ww 
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140. Booth, supra note 123. 
141. YORAM COHEN & JEFFREY WHITE, WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST 
POLICY, HAMAS IN COMBAT: THE MILITARY PERFORMANCE OF THE PALESTINIAN ISLAM-
IC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT 10 (2009), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Doc 
uments/pubs/PolicyFocus97.pdf. 
142. Additional Protocol I, supra note 62, arts. 38(2), 66(8); Hague Cultural Property 
Convention, supra note 133, art. 17. The term “internationally recognized emblems” also 
includes the protective emblem for hospital zones, the letters “PG” or “PW” to mark 
prisoner of war camps and the letters “IC” to mark civilian internment camps. See Geneva 
Convention I, supra note 65, art. 23; Geneva Convention III, supra note 78, art. 23; Geneva 
Convention IV, supra note 65, arts. 14, 83. 













ance with the prescribed conditions, deployed widely wherever possible 
and permanently under a strict control of the conditions of its use.144 
 
This proscription serves a similar purpose to the basic inviolabilities and 
immunities of UN facilities: to ensure that specially protected facilities, ob-
jects and personnel can continue to serve their essential functions at all 
times, free from obstruction by government, armed entities or other agents. 
Indeed, although UN facilities do not enjoy any special protection under 
LOAC comparable to medical, religious or cultural property, the UN em-
blem is specifically noted in the provisions on improper use, an explicit 
demonstration of LOAC and general privileges and immunities law work-
ing in concert.  
U.S. military manuals and those of other States offer several examples 
of improper use of the distinctive emblem of the red cross, many of which 
have been reported in Gaza as well,145 including  
 
using a hospital or other building accorded such protection as an observa-
tion post or military office or depot; firing from a building or tent display-
ing the emblem of the Red Cross; using a hospital train or airplane to fa-
cilitate the escape of combatants; displaying the emblem on vehicles con-
taining ammunition or other nonmedical stores; and in general using it 
for cloaking acts of hostility.146 
 
These acts coincide with the type of activity that causes civilian objects to 
become military objectives based on their use, as explained previously, thus 
losing their protection from attack. But the loss of immunity from attack is 
not the only consequence here—improper or unauthorized use of the dis-
tinctive emblems resulting in death or serious injury is a war crime under 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.147 Thus, LOAC does 
not rely solely on the loss of immunity from attack as a motivation for par-
                                                                                                                      
144. PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 91, at 450. 
145. Yaakov Lappin, Fighting Terrorists Who Move Around in Ambulances, JERUSALEM 
POST (July 20, 2014), http://www.jpost.com/Operation-Protective-Edge/Analysis-Fightin 
g-terrorists-who-move-around-in-ambulances-363498.  
146. U.S Department of the Army, FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare ¶ 55 (1956); 
see also Department of the Air Force, AFP 110-31, International Law—The Conduct of 
Armed Conflict and Air Operations ¶ 8-6(b) (1976); UK MANUAL, supra note 85, § 5.10.1 
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A hospital protected by the red cross emblem must not be used as an observation post, 
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ties to a conflict to refrain from misuse of protected facilities, but instead 
makes that misuse itself a violation of the law to reinforce the prohibition 
against use of specially protected objects for military purposes. 
Third, beyond the prohibition on improper use of distinctive emblems, 
the perfidious use of such emblems, signs or signals provided for in the 
Geneva Conventions or the Additional Protocols to kill, injure or capture 
an adversary is a grave breach of Additional Protocol I.148 Using a UN facil-
ity, the UN emblem, or other protected emblems to launch attacks149 is, in 
and of itself, a grave breach. Perfidy, as defined in Article 23(b) of the Reg-
ulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention on land warfare, “is [t]o 
kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or 
army.”150 A particularly insidious violation of LOAC, perfidy contravenes 
the very notions of honor and chivalry on which much of LOAC is based. 
Article 37(1) of Additional Protocol I offers a more comprehensive formu-
lation, forbidding killing, capturing, or injuring the enemy “by resort to per-
fidy.” In particular, the Protocol states that “[a]cts inviting the confidence 
of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to 
accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed 
conflict, with intent to betray that confidence, shall constitute perfidy.” 151 
As a result, it is not the act of hiding from the enemy or making oneself 
less noticeable that is the essence of perfidy, but the use of what appears to 
be protected status.  
The Commentary to the Additional Protocols explains that “[t]he central 
element of the definition of perfidy is the deliberate claim to legal protec-
tion for hostile purpose. The enemy attacks under cover of the protection 
accorded by humanitarian law of which he has usurped the signs.”152 Thus, 
                                                                                                                      
148. Additional Protocol I, supra note 62, art. 85(3)(f). 
149. See supra text accompanying notes 136–147. 
150. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23(b), an-
nexed to Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539. The prohibition on killing treacherously dates back to 
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acts of perfidy.” U.S. Department of War, Instructions for the Government of Armies of 
the United States in the Field art. 16, General Orders No. 100, Apr. 24, 1863, reprinted in 
THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 3 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 4th rev. ed. 
2004) [hereinafter Lieber Code]. 
151. Additional Protocol I, supra note 62, art. 37(1). 
152. PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 91, at 435 (explaining that the “definition 
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when fighters intentionally disguise themselves as civilians in order to lead 
soldiers on the opposing side to believe they need not take defensive action 
to guard against attack, they commit perfidy. As indicated previously, Addi-
tional Protocol I also prohibits as perfidy the use of distinctive emblems—
whether the red cross, red crescent, red lion and sun, or red crystal, or the 
UN emblem—to invite the adversary’s confidence and then launch an at-
tack.153 Such misuse of the emblems of protected status is also a war crime 
under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.154  
A particularly egregious and catastrophic example of perfidy using the 
UN emblem took place in Srebrenica in the summer of 1995. As the Bos-
nian Serbs overran the UN’s safe haven of Srebrenica, thousands of Bosni-
an Muslims fled the city, seeking safety elsewhere. As a long column of 
Bosnian Muslim men—who had been forcibly separated from their fami-
lies—tried to reach Bosnian government territory and safety, they faced 
repeated attacks by Bosnian Serb forces. Eventually, “Bosnian Serb soldiers 
wearing stolen UN uniforms and driving stolen UN vehicles announced 
over megaphones [that they were UN peacekeepers and that they were] 
prepared to oversee the Bosnian Muslims’ surrender and guarantee they 
would not be harmed.”155 The Bosnian Muslim men surrendered; shortly 
                                                                                                                      
ment)”). See also DÖRMANN, supra note 61, at 243 (“[I]t seems to be uncontroversial that 
perfidious acts are constituted by two elements. First, the act in question must objectively 
be of a nature to cause or at least to induce the confidence of an adversary. This confi-
dence must be created because of a precisely specified legal protection that either the ad-
versary himself is entitled to or that is a protection which he is legally obliged to accord.”). 
153. Additional Protocol I, supra note 62, art. 37(1)(d). 
154. Rome Statute, supra note 60, art. 8(2)(b)(vii) (“making improper use of a flag of 
truce, of the flag or of the military insignia and uniform of the enemy or of the United 
Nations, as well as of the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions, resulting in 
death or serious personal injury”). 
155. David Rohde, Perfidy and Treachery, CRIMES OF WAR, http://www.crimesofwar. 
org/a- zguide/perfidy-and-treachery/ (last visited June 6, 2016). See COMMISSION FOR 
INVESTIGATION OF THE EVENTS IN AND AROUND SREBRENICA 10TH AND 19TH JULY 
1995, THE EVENTS IN AND AROUND SREBRENICA BETWEEN 19TH AND 19TH JULY 1995, 
at 15 (2004), http://abunodisceomnes.wellcomecollection.org/wp-content/uploads/2014 
/09/Report-from-The-Commission-For-Investigation-of-the-Events-In-and-Around-Sreb 
renica-Between-10-and-19-July-1995-Vlada-Republika-Srpska-2004.pdf [hereinafter MAS-
SACRE AT SREBRENICA]. See also Prosecutor v. Karadzic & Mladic, Case. No. IT-95-18-I, 
Initial Indictment, ¶ 19 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Nov. 14, 1995) (“In 
many instances, assurances of safety were provided to the Muslims by Bosnian Serb mili-
tary personnel who were with other Bosnian Serb soldiers wearing stolen UN uni-
forms . . . .”); GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMAN-












thereafter, the Bosnian Serb forces killed all of them and buried them in 
mass graves.156 The Bosnian Serbs’ conduct is a textbook example of perfi-
dy: they used the stolen UN uniforms and vehicles to gain the Bosnian 
Muslims’ confidence, induce their surrender and then kill them. Indeed, the 
UN Commission of Experts examining violations of LOAC committed in 
the territory of the former Yugoslavia concluded that  
 
[i]f it can be established that [the Bosnian Serb army] used or authorized 
the use of vehicles which carried UN markings, this could be viewed as 
perfidious conduct and, if persons were killed or wounded as a result of 
this action, a grave breach of [Additional Protocol I] could be estab-
lished.157 
 
Although the prohibition on perfidious attacks focuses on the use of 
the UN emblem, flag or uniform, the foundational concept on which this 
proscription is based—preventing the use of emblems or objects that invite 
the adversaries’ confidence—provides a useful analytical framework for 
understanding why all UN facilities must be free from military use during 
conflict. At least one incident from the 2014 Gaza conflict is a telling ex-
ample: in July 2014, three Israeli soldiers were killed when they entered a 
booby-trapped health clinic building bearing the UNRWA sign above its 
door.158 The soldiers were attempting to destroy or neutralize a terror tun-
nel shaft—a lawful military objective—housed under the health clinic.159 
When they entered, the entire building, wired for this purpose, exploded.160 
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156. Karadzic & Mladic, supra note 155, ¶¶ 19–20; MASSACRE AT SREBRENICA, supra 
note 155; John Grimond, Nowhere to Hide: How Bosnian Serbs Executed 7,000 Muslims Under 
the Eyes of the U.N. and the World, NEW YORK TIMES (May 11, 1997), http://www.nytimes. 
com/books/97/05/11/reviews/970511.11grimont.html (reviewing DAVID RHODE, EN-
GAGE: THE BETRAYAL AND FALL OF SREBRENICA, EUROPE’S WORST MASSACRE SINCE 
WORLD WAR II (1997)).  
157. Annexes to the Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursu-
ant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), transmitted by Letter dated 24 May 1994 
from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council-Addendum, annex 
VI.B, ¶ 85, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674/Add.2 (Vol. III), (Dec. 28, 1994). 
158. Mitch Ginsburg, Militants “Blow Up UNRWA Clinic,” Killing 3 Soldiers, TIMES OF 
ISRAEL (July 30, 2014), http://www.timesofisrael.com/3-idf-soldiers-killed-in-booby-trapp 
ed-unrwa-clinic/. 
159. Id. 
160. Booby-traps, unfortunately, are notoriously indiscriminate; it takes little imagina-
tion to consider the harm that could have befallen civilians who might have innocently 













Furthermore, at least one news report suggests that the clinic was not a UN 
facility, but rather that the UNRWA sign was placed there either to shield 
the tunnel or to lure enemy soldiers into the building on the assumption it 
was a protected facility and therefore safe to enter.161 Either option, wheth-
er using medical units to shield military objectives or the commission of 
perfidy, is a serious violation of LOAC and a war crime. 
 
4. The Limits of Inviolability 
 
LOAC prohibits the use of specially protected objects and designated em-
blems for military purposes. LOAC also provides that even specially pro-
tected sites or objects can become lawful targets of attack if used to com-
mit acts harmful to the enemy. These rules work in tandem to maximize 
protection for essential civilian facilities by seeking to keep such facilities 
removed entirely from combat. Understanding this relationship is essential 
to understanding why a framework of absolute inviolability would under-
mine the very goals its proponents seek to achieve. 
The failure to consider certain objects or buildings as “never targets,” 
regardless of use or abuse, is not a failure of LOAC to provide appropriate 
protections. Rather, the loss of protection from attack due to military use is 
essential to fulfill LOAC’s core purpose of protecting civilians and to en-
sure that the law reflects the realities of military operations and armed con-
flict. Legal regulation of conflict has rested for centuries on the notion of 
separating conflict and combat operations from the civilian population and 
civilian areas.162 Removing combat from civilian areas helps to protect civil-
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See Protocol (II) on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and 
Other Devices as amended on May 3, 1996 art. 7(1)(a)(d), 2048 U.N.T.S. 93; 1 CUSTOM-
ARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 85, r. 80.  
161. Ginsburg, supra note 158; Shalom Bear, Booby-Trapped (UNRWA) Clinic Update, 
JEWISHPRESS.COM (July 31, 2014), http://www.jewishpress.com/news/breaking-news/bo 
oby-trapped-unrwa-clinic-update/2014/07/31/. Israel later reported that the building in 
question was a Palestinian Ministry of Health clinic rather than a UNRWA clinic. See THE 
2014 GAZA CONFLICT, 7 JULY–26 AUGUST 2014: FACTUAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS, supra 
note 6, at 102–3. If so, the same rules would nonetheless apply with regard to perfidy and 
booby-traps. 
162. See PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 91, at 585 (“The notion that war is 
waged between soldiers and that the population should remain outside hostilities was in-
troduced in the sixteenth century and became established by the eighteenth century.”); 
Lieber Code, supra note 150, art. 22 (“Nevertheless, as civilization has advanced during the 












ians from incidental harm and suffering during conflict. For this reason, 
LOAC includes numerous provisions requiring parties to a conflict to re-
frain from locating military objectives in densely populated areas,163 to re-
move civilians from areas of active hostilities where feasible164 and to re-
frain from using civilians and civilian objects as shields for military opera-
tions.165 These obligations placed on the defending party to take precau-
tions form a critical complement to the precautionary measures required of 
attacking parties. As the Commentary explains, “[b]elligerents may expect 
their adversaries to conduct themselves [lawfully] and to respect the civilian 
population, but they themselves must also cooperate by taking all possible 
precautions for the benefit of their own population as is in any case in their 
own interest.”166 Parties therefore have an obligation to protect their own 
civilians from the consequences of their own offensive actions as well as 
those of the enemy.  
Equally important, LOAC’s requirement that services and facilities es-
sential for the civilian population and its protection, such as hospitals, reli-
gious and cultural property, and UN installations and units, should not be 
used for military purposes seeks to ensure that such facilities remain availa-
ble to provide for the imperative needs of the civilian population. Housing 
troops 
 
in purely civilian buildings, for example, in dwellings or schools, or [us-
ing] such buildings as a base for combat, exposes . . . the civilians present 
there to serious danger: even if attacks are directed only against members 
of the armed forces, it is probable that they will result in significant dam-
age to the buildings.167  
 
These dangers are significantly greater with regard to facilities providing 
essential services to the civilian community because of the likelihood that 
more civilians—and in particular civilians who are vulnerable or in need of 
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163. Additional Protocol I, supra note 62, art. 58(b). 
164. Id. art. 58(a). 
165. Id. arts. 12(4), 51(7); Geneva Convention III, supra note 78, art. 23; Geneva Con-
vention IV, supra note 65, art. 28. 
166. PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 91, at 692. 













various types of assistance and protection—are using the facilities and thus 
placed in danger. 
If civilian objects become military objectives by dint of their use or 
purpose,168 they can be targeted in accordance with the rules and principles 
governing all targeting during armed conflict: distinction, proportionality 
and precautions. For a host of reasons, parties to a conflict will seek to 
avoid using force against such objects even in the face of such military use 
or will use the minimum possible force in order to protect these critically 
important facilities. But those decisions reflect important policy and strate-
gic choices and do not change the legal analysis of whether an attack in 
such circumstances is a violation of LOAC or is lawful.169 The question of 
lawfulness is the key issue in analyzing the scope and extent of protection 
for such objects, and for UN facilities in particular, the subject of the in-
stant discussion. Thus, if an object can become a lawful target of attack, its 
protection or inviolability cannot be absolute. LOAC does not have differ-
ent rules for objects that were once civilian objects or serve both military 
and civilian purposes at the same time; just as there are no intermediate 
targets, there are no intermediate rules.170 Allowing some objects to be 
permanently immune from attack simply invites parties to a conflict to use 
such facilities for military purposes, knowing that they will be “safe.” A rule 
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that accepts and incentivizes one side to position itself in hospitals and reli-
gious buildings is unacceptable by any measure.   
  
B. Incidental Harm to UN Facilities: Proportionality and Precautions 
 
In January 2009, Israeli forces responded to mortar fire from Hamas mili-
tants inside a UN school in Jabaliya, Gaza. Three Israeli artillery shells 
“landed close to the al-Fakhura school . . . , spraying shrapnel on people 
both inside and outside the building.”171 The previous day, debris and 
shrapnel from an Israeli strike on an apartment building housing a Hamas 
weapons storage site and workshop caused extensive damage to the 
UNRWA Bureij Health Centre across the street, one death and several ex-
tensive injuries.172 These incidents, and many others from the 2009 and 
2014 conflicts in Gaza, highlight the dangers civilians and civilian objects 
face from incidental harm suffered in the course of attacks on military ob-
jectives. LOAC seeks to minimize such harm as part of the fundamental 
goal of protecting civilians from the ravages of war. Therefore, the legal 
analysis of any particular attack does not end with the identification of a 
legitimate target, as discussed above in the analysis of whether particular 
objects constitute military objectives.173 Rather, an attacking party must take 
steps to help ensure that any attacks on lawful military objectives will min-
imize harm to civilians, in accordance with the principles of proportionality 
and precautions. The application of these rules is thus essential to under-
standing the protection UN facilities enjoy—and the limits of that protec-
tion. 
The principle of proportionality requires that parties refrain from at-
tacks in which the expected civilian casualties will be excessive in relation 
to the anticipated military advantage gained and is well accepted as custom-
ary international law applicable in all armed conflicts.174 Additional Proto-
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col I prohibits any “attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss 
of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combina-
tion thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and di-
rect military advantage anticipated.”175 This language demonstrates that 
LOAC contemplates incidental civilian casualties. Importantly, therefore, 
while it seeks to minimize civilian harm to the greatest extent possible, the 
law does not prohibit all civilian deaths or damage to civilian objects. As 
the German Federal Court emphasized in the Fuel Tankers case,  
 
[e]ven if the killing of several dozen civilians would have had to be antici-
pated . . . , from a tactical-military perspective this would not have been 
out of proportion to the anticipated military advantages. The literature 
consistently points out that general criteria are not available for the as-
sessment of specific proportionality because unlike legal goods, values 
and interests are juxtaposed which cannot be “balanced” . . . . Therefore, 
considering the particular pressure at the moment when the decision had 
to be taken, an infringement is only to be assumed in cases of obvious 
excess where the commander ignored any considerations of proportional-
ity and refrained from acting “honestly,” “reasonably” and “competently” 
. . . .176 
 
The law therefore requires that military commanders and decision-makers 
assess both the advantage to be gained from an attack and the expected 
civilian casualties, and determine whether the attack is likely to result in ex-
cessive civilian harm.  
Proportionality must be viewed prospectively, not in hindsight, as the 
very language of Additional Protocol I shows, referring to “anticipated” 
military advantage and “expected” civilian casualties. Furthermore, as is 
particularly relevant in the context of attacks like those in Gaza that cause 
incidental harm to UN hospitals, schools and other locations where civil-
ians seek refuge from the dangers and consequences of military operations, 
a retrospective approach falls prey to the vastly different nature of military 
advantage and civilian casualties. The former is abstract, has little or no 
emotional impact, and is difficult to convey in pictures, while civilian casu-
alties are dramatic and emotional and “lend themselves to powerful pic-
                                                                                                                      
175. Additional Protocol I, supra note 62, art. 51(5)(b); see also id. arts. 57(2)(a)(iii), 
57(2)(b). 













tures and strong reactions.”177 Observers will often find it difficult to assess 
fairly whether collateral damage is excessive in practice because the military 
advantage from an attack may not be immediately apparent. Indeed, it may 
seem simpler to merely add up the resulting civilian casualties and injuries 
after an attack and assess the actual value gained from a military operation, 
because “the results of an attack are often tangible and measurable, where-
as expectations are not.”178 However, doing so fails to do justice to the 
complexities inherent in combat; rather, the question is “whether a reason-
ably well-informed person in the circumstances of the actual perpetrator, 
making reasonable use of the information available to him or her, could 
have expected excessive civilian casualties to result from the attack.”179  
LOAC also mandates that all parties take certain precautionary 
measures to protect civilians. At the broadest level, Article 57(1) of Addi-
tional Protocol I states: “[i]n the conduct of military operations, constant 
care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian ob-
jects.” Next, parties must take all feasible precautions in launching attacks 
that may affect the civilian population. First, parties must do everything 
feasible to ensure that targets are military objectives. Second, they must 
choose the means and methods of attack with the aim of minimizing inci-
dental civilian losses and damage.180 In addition, when choosing between 
two possible attacks offering similar military advantage, parties must 
choose the objective that offers the least likely harm to civilians and civilian 
objects.181 Proportionality considerations are also a major component of 
the precautions framework. Parties are required to refrain from any attacks 
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that would be disproportionate and to cancel any attacks where it becomes 
evident that the expected civilian losses would be excessive in light of the 
anticipated military advantage. Finally, Article 57(2)(c) of Additional Proto-
col I requires attacking parties to issue an effective advance warning “of 
attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do 
not permit.”  
The obligations mandated by the principles of proportionality and pre-
cautions are essential to protecting the civilian population and civilian ob-
jects from harm during conflict. At the same time, LOAC is clear that the 
simple fact of civilian deaths, injuries or harm to civilian objects does not 
constitute a legal violation, in the absence of a deliberate, indiscriminate or 
disproportionate attack. This analysis holds true whether the objects 
harmed are ordinary civilian objects or specially protected objects—
nothing in the law imposes a strict liability standard for harm to medical 
establishments or religious or cultural property, for example. The Commen-
tary to Additional Protocol I thus notes that “even though an attack cannot 
be lawfully directed against medical units as such, it is not totally out of the 
question for them to be damaged during attacks on military objectives, 
even though various precautions must be taken during these attacks.”182 
When one party to a conflict comingles fighters with civilians and civilian 
objects or locates military objectives in and around protected facilities, a 
tragic and unfortunate consequence may often be incidental harm to those 
civilians and protected facilities. During the 2014 conflict in Gaza, the di-
rector of UN operations in Gaza confirmed that “yes, the armed groups 
are firing the rockets into Israel from the vicinity of UN facilities . . . abso-
lutely.”183 The fighters launching the rockets and the rocket launchers 
themselves are legitimate targets of attack and are thus placing the UN fa-
cilities and the civilians they assist directly in harm’s way. In such circum-
stances, incidental harm to UN facilities or other protected or civilian ob-
jects nearby from strikes on those fighters or launchers must be assessed 
through the lens of the principle of proportionality and not as deliberate 
attacks. 
An examination of the UN Board of Inquiry report from the 2014 Ga-
za conflict suggests that the UN’s argument of absolute immunity or invio-
lability includes immunity from incidental harm, as well as from deliberate 
attacks (none of the incidents in the report involved deliberate attacks on 
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UN facilities as military objectives).184 However, the notion of absolute 
immunity from incidental harm runs counter to the principle of propor-
tionality and the foundational underpinnings of LOAC itself. According to 
the summary of the report, the Board of Inquiry appears to conclude that 
harm to a UN school, medical clinic or other facility caused in the course 
of an attack on a lawful target—such as three Hamas militants on motorcy-
cles or a weapons cache in an apartment building—is unlawful regardless 
of the extent of the harm, the intent of the commander, or the efforts tak-
en to minimize that harm.185 And yet these considerations regarding the 
nature of the actual target, the precautions taken, and the expected harm to 
civilians are the very tools LOAC uses to determine lawfulness. 
Eliminating LOAC’s acceptance of incidental harm with respect to UN 
facilities in this manner is akin to imposing a strict liability standard in 
which only the end result of the attack matters, regardless of the nature of 
the target, the information known to the commander, the tactics of the en-
emy or any other considerations.  
LOAC firmly rejects this type of effects-based analysis. Although an at-
tack on a lawful target will be unlawful if the expected civilian casualties, 
civilian injury or damage to civilian objects are excessive in light of the an-
ticipated military advantage gained, this analysis must be made based on the 
circumstances and information available at the time of the attack, not the 
results and facts that come to light afterwards. Thus, since the time of the 
Nuremberg Tribunals, the law has required that “an individual should not 
be charged or convicted on the basis of hindsight but on the basis of in-
formation available to him or information he recklessly failed to obtain at 
the time in question.”186 The ICTY has consistently taken the same ap-
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proach, holding that in order “to establish the mens rea of a disproportion-
ate attack, the Prosecution must prove . . . that the attack was launched 
willfully and in knowledge of circumstances giving rise to the expectation 
of excessive civilian casualties.”187 In contrast, an effects-based approach 
lowers this legal standard for culpability from intentional or reckless, as set 
forth in the ICTY’s and other international jurisprudence, to wrong after 
the fact even if reasonable at the time.  
The strict liability standard that absolute immunity imposes—i.e., ask-
ing only “was a UN facility damaged” but not “was the expected harm ex-
cessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage gained”—would 
thus require commanders to operate with a standard that allows for no er-
rors. Doing so would run counter to the established legal standard in Addi-
tional Protocol I, the ICTY Statute, the Rome Statute and customary inter-
national law: that commanders are obligated to make reasonable decisions 
based on the information available at the time of the attack. The “law does 
not judge commanders based on the outcome alone, nor does it require 
commanders to be right in all circumstances.”188  
Using a strict liability standard for UN facilities based on effects after 
the fact is not just wrong as a matter of law. It also raises significant con-
cerns about the misapplication and future development of LOAC, ulti-
mately leading to greater danger for the civilians and civilian areas the law 
seeks to protect. First, the effects-based approach disregards the notion of 
targeting as methodology and ignores operational realities that inform both 
the targeting process and any careful analysis thereof. Proportionality and 
precautions are not simply rules or principles to be checked off on a list 
before launching an attack. Rather, they form the core of a methodology of 
targeting that guides the law-compliant military in implementing LOAC as 
part of effective and efficient military operations. Proportionality and pre-
cautions are thus components of a comprehensive prospective process to 
assess the lawfulness of an attack on a target or as part of a more complex 
mission. Once a lawful target is identified, implementing proportionality 
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requires an understanding of why a target is militarily valuable; that is, how 
destroying, capturing or neutralizing the target will contribute to the tactical 
and operational goals of the mission. For example, will the use of suppress-
ing fire or other fire support for ground forces contribute to those forces’ 
ability to fulfill the mission? A commander must assess if and how any 
such actions will weaken the enemy’s forces, as well as whether and how 
they will strengthen the commander’s own forces. That analysis is key to 
understanding the “anticipated military advantage gained” component of 
proportionality for harm to UN facilities or people in or near such facilities, 
just like any other object.  
Careful consideration of the risk to civilians and the likely numbers of 
civilian casualties is equally essential—a commander must gather infor-
mation regarding civilians who live and work in the area, their patterns of 
movement, whether they would be susceptible to the methods and means 
of attack under consideration, how many might be present at the time of 
and within the blast radius of the attack, and any other information rele-
vant to understanding the potential consequences for civilians in the area. 
He or she must also examine whether there is an alternative means or 
method of attack that could lessen harm to civilians and provide effective 
advance warning where feasible. Based on all of this prospective infor-
mation, the commander then makes a determination as to whether the at-
tack can go forward.  
Although difficult in many circumstances, commanders engage in this 
methodology and process every time they apply combat power with conse-
quences for civilians, sometimes in a longer, deliberative process and some-
times in the split second available for troops in contact and fleeting targets. 
Proportionality and precautions are more than just principles, therefore: 
they lie at the heart of a methodology for ensuring the application of com-
bat power in a manner that minimizes civilian harm in accordance with 
LOAC’s central mandates. The principles highlight the goal of a balance 
between military needs and humanitarian concerns that minimizes civilian 
harm as much as possible, and the methodology provides guidance on how 
to achieve that goal—by gathering and analyzing information about both 
the military value of a target and the consequences to the civilian popula-
tion and civilian objects in the area and making choices among various op-
erational alternatives to achieve the mission while minimizing harm to civil-
ians.  
This methodology functions in tandem with the operational realities of 













tions and the use of force against both planned and fleeting targets, includ-
ing the quality and quantity of intelligence about both enemy and civilian 
locations, the quality of equipment and munitions, the training and capabil-
ity of crews, timing, terrain, weather, fatigue, the location of fire support 
assets and many others. Although careful planning for military operations 
attempts to incorporate as many of these variables as possible, along with 
any attendant effects and variations, it is an axiom of military operations 
that “no plan survives first contact with the enemy.” Indeed, the enemy’s 
tactics, conduct and changes in situation throughout the course of the op-
eration are significant variables as well—not only in terms of the opera-
tional choices the attacking party makes, but also in terms of the effects of 
the military operations on civilians and civilian objects. All of these varia-
bles are integral to any targeting process at the time of the planning and the 
attack; they are all also relevant for a tribunal or court in assessing the rea-
sonableness of the commander’s decision-making process. In contrast to 
this sophisticated and reality-based methodology, a rule that says that dam-
age to a UN facility is a legal violation even if unintentional and unex-
pected, and regardless of process or effort expended to protect civilians 
and civilian objects, undermines the essential value of this methodology by 
leaving commanders with only the after-the-fact effects to determine right 
from wrong. 
This divorce from operational realities leads to the second problematic 
consequence of an absolute immunity, effects-based standard for harm to 
UN facilities: when commanders are faced with such a rule, the greatest 
danger is that they will disregard the law as irrelevant. Forcing a command-
er to a “no error” standard is simply ineffective and even dangerous for 
future operations. Commanders will either refrain from engaging in military 
operations altogether out of an overabundance of caution in the face of an 
impossible standard, or will simply disregard the law entirely as no longer 
relevant to their purposes and mission. Under either scenario, innocent ci-
vilians are the ultimate victims—a result directly at cross-purposes with a 
central goal of LOAC. 
Finally, the most direct and evident consequence of the effects-based 
approach is that it opens the door to a grave danger: the exploitation of the 
law by the defending party for its own defensive and propaganda purposes. 
If one party knows that any damage to a UN facility means the opposing 
party has committed a LOAC violation, and one certain to trigger interna-
tional condemnation, the defending party will simply locate its forces in 












and increased civilian suffering, and marginalizing or eliminating the critical 
services the UN provides for civilians. Unfortunately, both States and 
armed groups will continue to fight and engage in military operations, in-
cluding in densely populated areas and areas where the UN is providing 
essential services to the civilian population. At present, the prohibitions on 
improper use of protected facilities in both treaty and customary law are 
not enforced in any effective manner and even public condemnation of 
such abuse and exploitation of protected objects is all too rare, providing 
little, if any sanction for such violations.189 An absolute immunity rule thus 
merely ratifies the use of civilians and the civilian population—including 
the very operations present to serve that population—as a shield for mili-
tary operations. Absolute immunity for UN facilities may seem like the 
most protective option on first impression, but the law, the nature of com-
bat operations, and the willingness of some States and armed groups to 





LOAC provides the appropriate analytical legal tools to understand the 
protections UN facilities enjoy during armed conflict and the limits of 
those protections. Beyond the formal relationship between the privileges 
and immunities law of the UN and LOAC and aside from the inherent lim-
its on the CPIUN’s application to military operations, LOAC’s framework 
demonstrates precisely why absolute inviolability, even in the face of mili-
tary use, cannot be the rule for UN facilities or any other protected objects 
during armed conflict. Each of the protections, obligations and rules exam-
ined above contribute directly to and form the foundation for LOAC’s 
core goal of protecting civilians during conflict. They also represent the 
delicate balance between military necessity and humanity that lies at the 
heart of LOAC.190 Interpreting rights, obligations and protections during 
conflict in a manner contrary to LOAC’s core purposes will only serve to 
exacerbate suffering during conflict, thus undermining the law’s central ob-
jective of enabling “armed forces to achieve their strategic military objec-
tive while mitigating, to the extent feasible, the humanitarian suffering re-
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sulting from armed conflict.”191 If UN facilities are absolutely inviolable 
with regard to both attacks and use for military purposes, there is no mech-
anism to protect against the use and exploitation of such facilities for mili-
tary purposes. First, the prohibitions against such use are insufficiently en-
forced. Second, the armed groups and armed forces that engage in such 
improper use are clearly not concerned about LOAC compliance or any 
possible public condemnation. Third, such groups gain an unreasonable 
operational benefit as a result if they can shield their military forces and 
equipment from attack; and fourth, these groups reap a substantial propa-
ganda windfall in the event of any attack on their forces, equipment or po-
sitions near or in such facilities because the attacking party automatically 
faces public condemnation and criminal responsibility. 
Inviolability of UN facilities in all locations and situations is essential. 
However, the idea of absolute immunity, as framed by many responses to 
damage to UN facilities in Gaza, runs counter to the very framework of 
LOAC, which balances the protection for certain sites (such as hospitals or 
religious and cultural property) with the legitimate needs of military opera-
tions in the face of fighters abusing that protection. Although the urge to 
demand that such inviolability be absolute is understandable, granting pro-
tection to those misusing protected sites ultimately harms only the civilians 
in desperate need of the UN’s services.   
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